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The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens
of Persuasion in Criminal Cases
Barbara D. Underwoodt
At the heart of most criminal cases is a dispute about facts. Legal
systems have devised a range of procedures for collecting evidence and
bringing it to the attention of the factfinder who is to resolve the
dispute.' At the end of that process, the factfinder holds the metaphori-
cal scales of Justice, the evidence goes into the balance pans, and the
scale registers a result. The factfinder is not, however, left simply to
weigh the evidence and report which side is heavier. Courts and
legislatures have developed a substantial array of legal rules that tinker
with the factfinding process, in effect putting a thumb on the scale.2
Among the most important of these rules are those that tell the
factfinder how to decide close cases, and when to regard a case as close.
f Associate Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. For the growing literature on the differences between the adversary methods for
collecting evidence in Anglo-American law, and the nonadversary methods of continental
law, see Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1083 (1975) and sources cited, id. at 1083 n.l.
2. This article examines the rules that regulate the burden of persuasion in criminal
cases, and considers to some extent the rules that regulate the burden of producing
evidence, see note 3 infra. Other rules specify that certain evidence is of limited value
in factfinding, e.g., cautionary instructions or corroboration requirements for accom-
plice testimony, see 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2056 (3d ed. 1940); or that certain evidence
is necessary to support a finding, e.g., the Constitutional requirement of two witnesses or
a confession for a conviction of treason, U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 1; or that certain
evidence is sufficient to support a finding, e.g., inferences or presumptions that either
permit or direct the factfinder to infer one fact from evidence that proves some other
fact. Dei ices in this last category take many forms, and the labels "inference" and
..presumption" are used without consistent meaning; for a catalogue, see Laughlin, In
Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 'MICH. L. REV. 195, 195-209 (1953),
and a helpful chart in R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 884
(1977). For a good discussion of the relationship between these devices and rules regulat-
ing the burden of persuasion and the burden of producing evidence, see Ashford &
Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical
Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969).
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In the established terminology, these rules regulate the burden of
persuasion.3 This burden is said to have both a location and a weight:
the location specifies the party that loses if the burden is not met, and
the weight specifies how persuasive the evidence must be in order to
carry the burden.
The common metaphor of carrying burdens may obscure more than
it enlightens. It seems helpful instead to think of the rules as defining
the zone in which the dispute over facts is too close for decision by the
factfinder, and providing a rule for the decision of such cases. Thus,
a rule fixing the weight of the burden defines the zone in which the
factfinder is to regard the dispute as too close for decision, and a rule
fixing the location tells the factfinder who wins when the case is in
that zone.4
On either view of the rules, their intended effect is the same. In
3. An unfortunate confusion of terminology requires some clarification. A distinction
must be made between the burden of persuasion, which regulates the decision of close
cases by the factfinder, and the burden of producing evidence, which specifies the result
when the evidence on an issue is nonexistent, or inadequate to satisfy some threshold
requirement. A rule assigning the burden of producing evidence is one kind of rule
specifying the evidence necessary to support a finding. It has two important features:
first, like a rule assigning the burden of persuasion, it provides that when the evidence
is inadequate, the party with the burden loses; second, unlike a rule assigning the
burden of persuasion, it operates in a jury trial to remove the issue from the jury.
When the burden of producing evidence is not satisfied, the judge resolves the issue.
This second function, of allocating issues between judge and jury, is the aspect of the
rule most commonly discussed, and indeed it is the only function of the rule if the same
party has both the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion. See
McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of Persuasion,
68 HARV. L. REv. 1382 (1955). But it is also possible to assign the burden of producing
evidence to the party who does not have the burden of persuasion. In that case, the
rule does not only allocate issues between judge and jury; it has an effect even in a
trial to a judge. The effect is to create a trigger mechanism: when the evidence on an
issue is nonexistent or inadequate to meet the threshold requirement, the party with the
burden of producing evidence loses; once there is enough evidence to cross that threshold,
then the issue counts as a contested issue and the loss falls on the other party, the one
with the burden of persuasion, unless the evidence for his position satisfies that burden.
The distinction between the burden of persuasion and the burden of production is
usually attributed to Thayer. See J. Tn.u\YrR, A PRELIMINARY TRrETisE oN EvmENCE AT
THE COMMuON LAw 355-59 (1898).
Before the distinction had been illuminated by commentators, the term burden of proof
was commonly used for both matters and to some extent that confusing usage continues.
It will be avoided in this article.
4. The metaphor of carrying burdens is confusing for two reasons. First, it suggests,
inaccurately, that the law is concerned with the extent of a party's labors, when in fact
the evidence that satisfies the burden may be introduced by either party. Second, it
seems implausible to tell the factfinder to reach a decision, attach a probability estimate
to that decision, and then use a legal rule about burdens to translate the decision into a
verdict, sometimes translating a decision for A into a ierdict for B. Once he has decided,
it seems odd to use a rule to tell him to change his decision. It is more sensible, and
truer to the purpose of the rule, to tell him not to decide when he cannot be sure
enough, and then to provide a legal rule to make the decision for him in such cases.
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civil cases, the location of the burden of persuasion may vary from
one issue to another, and its weight is usually proof by a preponder-
ance of evidence.a In the terms used here that means a factual dispute
is too close for decision if the two sides are in equipoise; in that event,
neither side can be said to have a preponderance of evidence and
therefore the party with the burden loses. In criminal cases, the
burden of persuasion for most issues is placed on the government, and
the weight of that burden is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Under
a reasonable doubt rule the zone of uncertainty is larger; so long as the
evidence is not overwhelming, the dispute is too close for decision, and
the loss falls on the government as the party with the burden.6
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal
cases was given constitutional status by the Supreme Court in 1970, in
the case of In re Wfinship,7 which held that the "Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged."" The holding restated the general understand-
ing of the rule governing proof in a criminal case. The reasonable
doubt requirement had been recognized in Anglo-American law since
5. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.6 (1965); see 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498 (3d ed.
1940 & Supp. 1975). Some issues in a civil case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
as in a criminal case, and some must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which
is an intermediate standard.
6. Note that in these terms a criminal case is "close" if the evidence is evenly balanced,
and also if the evidence somewhat favors either the government or the defendant. In
the criminal context, such cases are generally regarded as easy to decide and not close at
all, but that is because the reasonable doubt rule clearly requires an acquittal, and not
because the factual dispute is easy to resolve. In the terminology of this article, they are
close cases on the evidence, easily decided only because of the rule that puts a thumb
on the scale.
Acquittals in criminal cases sometimes represent the factfinder's determination that
the defendant is clearly innocent, and sometimes result simply from the application of
the rule for resolving close cases. This collapsing of categories occurs in civil cases, too,
when the decision goes against the party with the burden of persuasion. But in criminal
cases, because the zone of uncertainty is larger, the acquittals resulting from the rule may
seem to dwarf those that represent a positive finding of innocence. For that reason it is
often said that an acquittal is not a finding of innocence, but only a refusal to find guilt.
See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938). But see Coffey v. United States,
116 U.S. 436, 444 (1886). On this view, it might be said that an acquittal of a guilty person
cannot be characterized as erroneous, but only as (at worst) undesirable. Nevertheless,
this article will refer to such decisions as erroneous or inaccurate, in order to have a
convenient way of describing the event of acquitting a guilty person. It is hardly mis-
leading to call such an acquittal erroneous, because an acquittal functions not as a
refusal to decide but as a decision that concludes the matter in dispute. Unlike a hung
jury, which leaves the matter open for future resolution, United States v. Perez, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 579 (1824), an acquittal bars any further criminal proceedings, Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969).
7. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
8. Id. at 364.
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at least 1798, and probably for several centuries before that.9 In-
deed, the occasion for announcing the constitutional status of the
rule arose only as a preliminary step in considering whether the same
rule should govern proof in an adjudication of juvenile delinquency.' 0
Nevertheless, the constitutionalization of the rule has generated sub-
stantial controversy. For despite widespread acceptance of the general
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the disagreement
over the proper scope of the rule is equally widespread. Most American
9. A well-known article traces the formula to the Irish Treason Trials of 1798,
Finney's Case, 26 How. St. Tr. 1019 (Ire. 1798), and Bond's Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 523
(Ire. 1798). May, Some Rules of Evidence: Reasonable Doubt in Civil and Criminal
Cases, 10 Ams. L. REV. 642, 656-58 (1876). Most courts and commentators have subscribed
to that view. E.g., C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 341, at 799 & n.88 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972);
9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2497 (3d ed. 1940). A recent reexamination of the theory of
the rule traces the phrase back even earlier, to the Boston Massacre Trials of 1770, Rex v.
Wemms, reported in 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMts 98-314 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds.
1965). Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule,
55 B.U. L. REV. 507, 515-19 (1975). Morano argues that prior to the articulation of this
standard, and its incorporation into English and American law over the course of a
century, the prevailing rule was even stricter, requiring proof beyond any doubt, reason-
able or not. Id. at 511-13. Here his evidence is somewhat less compelling. He cites (1) a
13th-century treatise stating that jurors should acquit "'if [they] are in doubt of the
matter and not certain,'" id. at 510 (quoting I BRITTON 26-27 (8th ed. F. Nichols trans.
1901)); (2) several 17th-century English cases requiring jurors to acquit if they are
not "satisfied in their consciences" of guilt, Morano, supra at 511-12 & n.37; and (3)
several 18th-century English cases requiring jurors to acquit "if they had any doubt
of the accused's guilt," id. at 512 & n.43 (emphasis in original). In addition, lie cites
the iwork of 17th-century philosophers and 18th-century commentators who argued
that "moral certainty" was the correct standard, moral certainty being reasonable, rather
than absolute, certainty. Id. at 513-14. Morano argues persuasively that the reasonable
doubt formulation was intended to caution against the use of an impossibly high
standard; it is less clear from his evidence that prior to its adoption a more stringent
standard was in fact in force. For the 13th-century, at least, the evidence seems incon-
clusive: "Presumably [13th-century jurors] had to have become convinced to the point
of virtual certainty, but we cannot determine by what standards they were to assess the
evidence and testimony brought to their attention before or during trial." Green, The
Jury and the English Law of Homicide, 1200-1600, 74 MicI. L. REV. 413, 424 n.45 (1976).
It is unclear, then, whether Anglo-American law ever provided for the trial of a criminal
case under a standard more stringent than proof beyond a reasonable doubt; there is no
suggestion that any less stringent standard has ever sufficed. A special and high
standard of proof has apparently been required of the government in criminal cases in
England and America from earliest times.
10. The Court held that it should. 397 U.S. at 368. More precisely, the Court held
the standard applicable to an adjudication of delinquency based on conduct that would
constitute a crime for an adult-here larceny, with a possible maximum sentence for the
juvenile of six years in a training school. Judgment was expressly reserved with respect
to delinquency proceedings not based on criminal conduct, and to the dispositional phase
of any delinquency proceeding. 397 U.S. at 359 n.l.
Two of the three dissenters (Chief Justice Burger in an opinion joined by Justice
Stewart) conceded the validity of the rule for adult criminal trials, limiting their objec-
tion to the extension of that rule to juvenile proceedings. 397 U.S. at 375-76. Only Mr.
Justice Black questioned the constitutional source of the requirement of proof by the
government beyond a reasonable doubt in an adult criminal trial, failing to find any
explicit constitutional language on the matter. 397 U.S. at 377 (Black, J., dissenting).
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jurisdictions have declined to apply that requirement to the proof of
every issue of fact in a criminal case. The burden of persuasion is
assigned to the defendant for some issues, so that in a close case the
prosecution wins. For other issues even though the burden remains on
the government, the weight of that burden is proof by a preponderance
of evidence, as in a civil case.
Almost every issue that has ever been denominated a "defense" to a
criminal charge has been exempted in some jurisdiction from the
requirement of proof by the government beyond a reasonable doubt,
either through reduction of the government's burden or through
allocation of the burden to the defendant. Sometimes allocation of the
burden of proving an issue to the defendant is in fact what is meant
by characterizing that issue as a "defense," or more commonly, as an
"affirmative defense," though usage in this matter is not standard-
ized." Defendants have been required to prove self-defense, 12 duress,' 3
11. The Model Penal Code uses the term "defense" without definition. "Affirmative
defense" is used to identify matters for which the defendant bears the burden of going
forward with some evidence but the government bears the burden of persuasion. The
Model Code employs no specific term for those enumerated issues for which the de-
fendant bears the burden of persuasion. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(2).
The proposed revision of the Federal Criminal Code uses the term "defense" to mean
anything designated as a defense or exception from criminal liability. It uses "affirma-
tive defense" to mean a defense for which the defendant bears the burden of persuasion.
S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 111 (Comm. Print May 2, 1977).
While statutes use the terms "defense" and "affirmative defense" in various ways,
some commentators speak of true defenses or true affirmative defenses. See, e.g., G. Dix
& M. Sharlot, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1034 (1973); Note, Constitutionality of
Affirmative Defenses in the Texas Penal Code, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 120, 121 (1976). This
usage suggests that there are some natural or correct criteria for classifying the factual
issues that specify the conditions for criminal conviction: some are properly part of
the definition of crime, others are defenses, and still others are affirmative defenses. This
tripartite division may follow the division into offensive conduct, justification, and excuse,
or it may follow some other principle.
This sort of classification may well provide an orderly or parsimonious description of
the criminal law, or facilitate analysis of its structure. See Fletcher, The Right Deed for
the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 293, 308-12 (1975). But
a classification devised for those purposes provides no particular assistance in determining
the proper allocation of the burden of persuasion. For that purpose the criteria set forth
in this article should be determinative, without regard to the classification of an issue
for some other purpose as part of the definition of crime or as a defense.
12. E.g., State v. Millett, 273 A.2d 504 (Me. 1971) (rule unconstitutional; instruction
placing burden on defendant harmless error because evidence insufficient); Evans v.
State, 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (1975) (rule unconstitutional); Commonwealth v.
Carbonetto, 455 Pa. 93, 97, 314 A.2d 304, 306 (1974); State v. Judge, 208 S.C. 497, 507, 38
S.E.2d 715, 720 (1946); State v. Collins, 154 W. Va. 771, 777, 180 S.E.2d 54, 58 (1971); Foley
v. State, 11 Wyo. 464, 482-83, 72 P. 627, 628-29 (1903).
13. E.g., Roy v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Ky. 1973); State v. Milam, 108
Ohio App. 254, 261, 156 N.E.2d 840, 843 (1959); DEL. CODE tit. II, § 464 (1975); TEx. PENAL
CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 8.05 (Vernon 1974).
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insanity,14 entrapment,' 5 renunciation, 0  and mistake?1 They have
been required to prove that their conduct falls within a specific excep-
tion written into the statutory definition of a particular crime.' 8 They
have been required to prove threshold matters such as the running of
the statute of limitations,' 9 and mental incompetence for trial.20
Like the reasonable doubt rule itself, some of these exemptions have
relatively ancient roots. 2  Nevertheless, the conflict between the rule
and the exceptions has never been adequately explained, despite peri-
odic efforts by courts and commentators.22
14. E.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952); People v. Rodriguez, 272 Cal. App.
2d 80, 86-87, 76 Cal. Rptr. 818, 882 (1969); Rivera v. State, 351 A.2d (Del.), appeal dis-
missed for want of substantial federal question, 429 U.S. 877 (1976); Grace v. State, 231
Ga. 113, 115, 200 S.E.2d 248, 249 (1973); Phillips v. State, 86 Nev. 720, 722, 475 P.2d 671,
672 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 940 (1971) (holding rule not changed by Winship);
Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 8-9, 268 A.2d 89, 93-95 (1970).
15. E.g., United States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799, 801-02 (2d Cir. 1971); People v. Moran,
1 Cal. 3d 755, 760-61, 463 P.2d 763, 765-66, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411, 413 (1970); People v.
Laietta, 30 N.Y.2d 68, 75, 281 N.E.2d 157, 161, 330 N.Y.S.2d 351, 356-57, cert. denied, 407
U.S. 923 (1972).
16. E.g., Cowart v. State, 136 Ga. App. 528, 529-31, 221 S.E.2d 649, 650-51 (1975); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1 (Supp. 1973).
17. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:3 (Supp. 1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.160
(2) (Supp. 1976) (reasonable belief of age as defense to statutory rape).
18. E.g., Nix v. State, 135 Ga. App. 672, 219 S.E.2d 6 (1975) (medical prescription as
defense to amphetamine possession); State v. Lynch, 197 N.W.2d 186, 190-91 (Iowa 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973) (same defense to narcotics possession, changed by recent
statute); Commonwealth v. Davis, 359 Mass. 758, 270 N.E.2d 925 (1971) (license as de-
fense to carrying pistol in automobile); but see Johnson v. Wright, 509 F.2d 828 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975) (Georgia rule requiring defendant to prove
existence of license as defense to concealed weapon charge violates due process).
19. Osborn v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 259, 268-72, 194 P.2d 176, 181-83 (1948).
20. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Brierley, 334 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Pa. 1971); State
v. Marks, 252 La. 277, 282-83, 211 So. 2d 261, 263 (1968), sentence vacated on other
grounds, 408 U.S. 933 (1972); ef. Young v. Smith, 8 Wash. App. 276, 278, 505 P.2d 824,
825 (1973) (determination of competency "an exercise of judicial discretion").
21. One example is the rule that the defendant bears the burden of proving provoca-
tion as a defense to murder (reducing the crime to manslaughter). See M. FOSTER, CROWN
LAw 255, 296-97 (Dublin 1767); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *201. A 1727 English
case may have established that rule. See The King v. Oneby, 2 Ld. Raym. 1485, 1497, 92
Eng. Rep. 465, 473 (K.B. 1727). The case was cited for that proposition in the im-
portant Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. York, 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 93, 113-15 (1845).
Recent scholarship suggests that this view of the case is incorrect, that Oneby, properly
read, imposed on the defendant only the burden of raising the defense by the introduc-
tion of some evidence, and not the ultimate burden of proof or "risk of nonpersuasion."
Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Prac-
tices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 902-907 (1968).
In the 19th century a number of English and American courts expressly imposed the
burden of proof on the defendant for a range of issues in a criminal case. See, e.g.,
M'Naghten's Case, 10 CI. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722-23 (H.L. 1843) (insanity
defense); R. v. Smith, 8 C. & P. 160, 173 Eng. Rep. 441 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1837) (self defense).
22. By far the best work on this problem is Fletcher, supra note 21, which compares
Anglo-American history and practice with that of France and West Germany. Recently
there has been a flurry of articles, see e.g., Osenbaugh, The Constitutionality of Affirma-
tive Defenses to Criminal Charges, 29 ARK. L. REV. 429 (1976); Comment, Affirmative
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The Supreme Court has provided little guidance in the search for a
coherent approach to the problem of allocating the burden of
persuasion in criminal cases. In Mullaney v. Wilbur 3 the Court
invalidated a state statute requiring the defendant to prove provoca-
tion as a defense to murder, reducing the crime to manslaughter. Two
years later in Patterson v. New York, 24 without overruling Mullaney,
the Court upheld a statute requiring the defendant to prove "extreme
emotional disturbance" as a defense to murder, reducing the crime to
manslaughter. The opinions in the two cases survey the factors that
have been thought relevant by lower courts and commentators in
deciding when the Constitution permits such burden-shifting, but in
neither case did the Court offer a framework for analyzing the
problem in future cases.2 5
The purpose of this article is to propose a coherent approach to the
problem of allocating the burden of persuasion in a criminal case.
First it will be necessary to consider in some detail the purposes of the
reasonable doubt rule, in order to measure the propriety of an exemp-
tion against the purposes of the rule. Part II then examines one
possible ground for exemption, and explores an important aspect of
the relationship between rules of proof and substantive criminal law.
An adjustment in the rules of proof has often seemed to offer an
attractive device for tempering the force of controversial substantive
law. If a legislature contemplates establishing a new and controversial
defense, then proponents and opponents may seek to compromise by
exempting the issue from the reasonable doubt rule. Part II examines
at some length that theory of fair compromise, and ultimately rejects
it as a ground for exempting issues from the reasonable doubt rule.
Defenses After Mullaney v. Wilbur: New York's Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 43
BROOKLYN L. REv. 171 (1971); Note, Affirmative Defenses and Due Process: The Constitu-
tionalitV of Placing a Burden of Persuasion on a Criminal Defendant, 64 GEo. L.J. 871
(1976); Comment, Unburdening the Criminal Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the
Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 390 (1976).
23. 421 U.S. 624 (1975).
24. 97 S. Ct. 2319 (1977).
25. The Court pointed to the fact that the Mullaney statute defined murder in such
a way that lack of provocation could be said to be part of the definition, while the
Patterson statute defined murder without regard to lack of extreme emotional distur-
bance, and then separately specified that extreme emotional disturbance was a defense. If
the reasonable doubt rule reached only those facts included in the legislative definition
of the crime, then a state could avoid the rule entirely by specifying that it is a crime to
be accused, and a defense to be innocent; short of that extreme position, the state could
avoid the rule for any particular issue by labelling that issue a defense. The Patterson
Court acknowledged that implication of its opinion, observing that "there are obviously
constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in this regard." Id. at 2327.
The only limit mentioned by the Court is the principle that the state cannot avoid the
rule entirely, by shifting to the defendant the burden on all issues. Further limits await
future elucidation by the Court.
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Part III considers a second possible reason for exempting issues from
the reasonable doubt rule: the need to alleviate special problems of
proof. The burden of persuasion has often been assigned to the de-
fendant for an issue on the ground that he has better access to evidence,
or on the ground that his claim is highly improbable. An examination
of these arguments suggests that special problems of proof may on rare
occasions support an exemption from the rule but that the conditions
for such an exemption are seldom met.
Finally Part IV identifies the critical distinction between the issues
in a criminal trial that implicate the values served by the reasonable
doubt rule, and the issues that do not. A principled distinction can be
drawn between the issues of fact that determine the guilt or innocence
of the defendant or the wrongfulness of his conduct, on the one hand,
and issues of fact that determine the admissibility of evidence or the
propriety of holding a trial, on the other. Among the facts that de-
termine guilt, however, distinctions can seldom if ever be justified in
relation to the purposes of the reasonable doubt rule.
I. Reasons for the Reasonable Doubt Rule
Two distinct functions are generally attributed to the requirement
that the government prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the
rule is meant to affect the outcome of individual cases, reducing the
likelihood of an erroneous conviction. Second, the rule is meant to
symbolize for society the great significance of a criminal conviction.
The Winship Court invoked both purposes, reasoning that the rule
was required both to protect the important interest of the accused
individual in avoiding incarceration and stigma, and to command
the respect and confidence of the community in the moral force of
the criminal law .2 Closer examination of these functions offers some
guidance for the task of defining the proper scope of the rule.
The first function of the reasonable doubt rule is to reduce the
chance of conviction in an individual case, by putting a thumb on the
defendant's side of the scales of justice. It directs the factfinder to
render a verdict of not guilty because the case is too close for decision,
even when the evidence suggests that guilt is somewhat more likely
than innocence, so long as the evidence for guilt is not overwhelming.
One reason for putting a thumb on the defendant's side is to com-
pensate for a systematic flaw in the scales. That is, factfinders may
favor the prosecution rather than weigh the evidence objectively. By
26. 397 U.S. at 363-64.
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tilting the scales toward the defendant, the reasonable doubt rule
restores the balance and thereby enhances the overall accuracy of the
decisionmaking process.27 An exception to the rule would seem de-
fensible if for some issue the scale is more trustworthy than usual and
the corrective is therefore unnecessary. 28
In reducing the likelihood of an erroneous conviction, the reason-
able doubt rule does not, however, simply restore an accurate balance;
it is also understood to introduce a deliberate imbalance, tilting the
scales in favor of the defendant. It represents "a fundamental value
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent
man than to let a guilty man go free." 29 This value choice may result
from a straightforward determination that the costs of an erroneous
conviction are greater than the costs of an erroneous acquittal. The
tilt may also be intended to provide a measure of protection against
the danger that prosecutors and factfinders might abuse their power
and arbitrarily impose those costs selectively on unpopular defendants.
In either case, the value choice calls for a rule that will reduce the
chance of convicting innocent people, even if the result is to reduce
the chance of convicting guilty people as well. To justify an exception
to the rule, then, it is not enough to find that the scale is not biased
against the defendant; an exception is appropriate only if the scale
also provides any requisite bias in favor of the defendant. That can
happen in either of two circumstances. For some issues, there might be
something special about the scale, so that it incorporates the desired
imbalance even without introducing the reasonable doubt rule. 30 For
other issues there might be something special about the issue, so that
the reasons requiring imbalance are not present, and errors favoring
the government are seen as no more costly-or even less costly-than
errors favoring the defendant. 31
The second function of the reasonable doubt rule, its symbolic
function, is to single out criminal convictions as peculiarly serious
among the adjudications made by courts. The reason for doing this
may be to enhance the moral force and deterrent effect of criminal
sanctions. On this view, the rule increases the cost of conviction by
increasing the opprobrium and stigma that accrue to those who are
convicted. Of course, this possible salutary effect might well be
27. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1149-53 (1960).
28. See Part III infra.
29. 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
30. See Part III infra.
31. See Part IV infra.
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dwarfed by the reduction in deterrence that results from the reduced
likelihood of convicting the guilty.
Alternatively, the symbolic function of the reasonable doubt rule
might be important not for its possible effect on criminal behavior,
but rather for its affirmation of shared moral purpose. It may be
thought valuable to make a public commitment to the principle of
protecting individuals against the state's power to convict, by giving
the accused in a criminal case a generous benefit of the doubt.32 On
either view of the symbolic function of the rule, it is associated with
the distinctive character of criminal adjudications. With respect to the
symbolic function, then, exceptions are appropriate only for issues that
for some reason do not share in that distinctive character.33
One might well question whether the reasonable doubt rule in fact
serves any of the functions invoked to support it. Unless the rule has
an effect on the decision of cases, it can neither correct bias in the
system nor introduce bias in favor of the defendant. Likewise, the
rule would ill serve its symbolic functions if it had no effect on the
decision of cases, or at least, if it were known to have no effect.
The evidence concerning the effectiveness of the rule is scant, but
it at least suggests that the rule affects the outcome of cases. No
published studies have compared a rule assigning the burden of
persuasion to the prosecutor with one assigning the burden to the
defendant. The difference between those two rules seems to be widely
acknowledged.34 It is generally agreed that factual disputes are some-
times difficult to resolve, and that a factfinder will therefore welcome,
understand, and follow a rule that specifies the outcome in a close
case.33
32. Professor Tribe has argued that these symbolic functions may also militate against
quantifying the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Tribe, Trial by Mathenat-
ics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1374 (1971); Tribe,
A Further Critique of Mathematical Proof, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1818 (1971). The argu-
ment, in brief, is that any attempt at quantification, such as the claim that conviction
is authorized when the factfinder is 99% convinced of guilt, necessarily quantifies some
acceptable risk of error. Tribe argues that it defeats an important symbolic function of
the rule to make explicit any finite acceptable risk of error, even though such a quantity
may in principle exist.
33. See Part IV infra, in which a criterion is proposed for identifying issues that can
properly be exempted from both the symbolic and the scale-tilting functions of the rule.
34. Typical is the observation that "[[n]o lawsuit can be decided, rationally, without
the application of the commonplace concept of burden of proof-the duty to persuade-
or as is sometimes otherwise stated the risk of non-persuasion." McBaine, Burden of
Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 242 (19,14). But see Dworkin, Eas v Cawes,
Bad Law, and Burdens of Proof, 25 VAND. L. RPv. 1151, 1164-67 (1972) (burden of persua-
sion almost never aid to decisionmaking).
35. Except insofar as there is reason to doubt whether jurors understand or follow
any instructions. For a report of a study in which 116 jurors all heard an instruction
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More controversy has developed over the practical effect of requir-
ing the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, rather
than by a preponderance of evidence. Judge Learned Hand was
skeptical about the difference between evidence which merely pre-
ponderates and evidence which excludes all reasonable doubt. Con-
ceding that a criminal defendant had a right to an instruction declaring
the stricter standard, he nevertheless denied that an appellate court, in
reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, could or should
distinguish between the evidence which should satisfy reasonable
men and the evidence which should satisfy reasonable men beyond
a reasonable doubt. While at times it may be practicable to deal
with these as separate without unreal refinements, in the long
run the line between them is too thin for day to day use.30
Judge Hand may simply have been expressing doubts about the
ability of an appellate court to make the necessary distinction on a
written record, but his language suggests that he also doubted the
ability of anyone to make so subtle a distinction.37
Two attempts have been made to study empirically the effect on the
factfinder of varying the instruction on the weight of the burden. The
results of both studies are inconclusive, but they suggest that the in-
struction can affect the outcome of a case. In one study, the Jury
Project at the London School of Economics conducted the same mock
trial of a rape case before many juries, varying only the instruction on
the burden of persuasion. 35 One set of juries heard this instruction on
reasonable doubt, similar to instructions commonly used in this
country: "[Before you convict] you should be sure beyond reasonable
doubt and by reasonable doubt I mean not a fanciful doubt that you
might use to avoid an unpleasant decision, but a doubt for which
reasons can be given." 30 Another set of juries heard an instruction that
requiring the government to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and nevertheless 2%
maintained the belief that the defendant had the burden of proving innocence, see
Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478 (1976).
36. United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726
(1944), overruled, United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972).
37. By contrast, the trial judge in Winship seems to have found the difference clear
enough. Framing the issue perfectly for appellate review, he found and put on the record
that the evidence of larceny in the case before him was convincing, but not convincing
beyond a reasonable doubt. 397 U.S. at 360 & n.2. See also United States v. Freeman, 498
F.2d 569, 576 (2d Cir. 1974).
38. This study is reported in L.S.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence,
1973 CRIM. L. REv. 208. See also Scaly & Cornish, Jurors and Their Verdicts, 36 MODERN
L. REV. 496 (1973) (reporting on effects of age, sex, and other characteristics of jurors).
39. L.S.E. Jury Project, supra note 38, at 213. Compare the pertinent part of the
pattern instruction on the burden of persuasion for federal criminal trials: "A reasonable
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is reportedly given with increasing frequency in England instead of
the instruction on reasonable doubt: "Before you convict you must
feel sure and certain on the evidence you have heard that the accused
is guilty."4 0 A third set of juries heard an instruction on preponder-
ance of evidence, similar to instructions commonly used in civil cases
in this country: "[B]efore you convict you must feel satisfied that it is
more likely than not that the accused is guilty.4 '
The conviction rate was highest for the preponderance instruction,
slightly lower for the reasonable doubt instruction, and much lower
for the "sure and certain" instruction.4 2 That result suggests that
jurors can distinguish between at least two levels of certainty, though
it also suggests that the standard instruction on reasonable doubt may
not adequately elicit that capacity from them. 43
The effect of instructions to juries has also been studied by Rita
doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense-the kind of doubt that would
make a reasonable person hesitate to act." I E. DEvWTr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 11.14 (3d ed. 1977).
40. L.S.E. Jury Project, supra note 38, at 213. For recent English cases approving this
instruction, see R. v. Holland, 118 NEW L.J. 1004 (C.A. 1968); R. v. Allan, [1969] 1 All
E.R. 91 (C.A.). One commentary on the Allan case notes:
The expression "beyond reasonable doubt," is the traditional description of the
standard required of the Crown, and the judge is still "on safe ground" if he uses
that expression: Hepworth and Fearnley [1955] Q.B. 600; but it now seems more
fashionable to direct the jury that they must "feel sure" of the prisoner's guilt
[directing attention to R. v. Holland].
1969 CRIM. L. REv. 49, 49.
41. L.S.E. Jury Project, supra note 38, at 214. Compare the pertinent part of the
pattern instruction on the burden of persuasion in federal civil trials: "To 'establish by a
preponderance of the evidence' means to prove that something is more likely so than
not so." 2 E. DEVITr & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 39, § 71.14.
42. Twenty-two juries heard the case, which involved charges against two defendants.
The evidence of rape was strong in the case of one defendant, and weak in the case of
the other. Results were tabulated for 257 individual jurors, rather than for jury panels.
Forty-four jurors heard the instruction on preponderance, of whom 30 (or 68%) con-
victed the first defendant and 18 (41%) convicted the second. One hundred and forty-
two jurors heard the reasonable doubt instruction, of whom 94 (66%) convicted the first
and 46 (32%) convicted the second. And 71 heard the sure and certain instruction, of
whom 39 (55%) convicted the first and 13 (18%) convicted the second. L.S.E. Jury Project,
supra note 38, at 216-17.
43. Similar results were obtained on repeated trials of a theft case. The same procedure
was followed, except that a slightly different iersion of the reasonable doubt instruction
was used: "[Y]ou should be sure beyond reasonable doubt and by a reasonable doubt I
mean not a fanciful doubt, but such a doubt that might affect you in daily business or
domestic decisions." Id. at 213. This time the conviction rate was once again much lower
for "sure and certain" than for the preponderance instruction (32/90 = 35% as compared
with 42/92 = 46%). Id. at 216. But the reasonable doubt instruction produced a similarly
low conviction rate, slightly lower in fact than "sure and certain" (43/137 = 31%). (Al-
though the results in the theft case show a trend in the same direction as that in the
rape case, the authors caution that the differences in conviction rates in the theft case
were not great enough to be statistically significant. Id. at 219.)
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James Simon, formerly associated with the Chicago Jury Project.44
Relying upon questionnaires rather than mock trials, she asked a
sample of sitting judges to translate into probability statements their
sense of what it means to be convinced by a preponderance of the
evidence, and to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.4. When
responding to questionnaires, at least,4 6 the judges thought there was
an important difference: almost a third of the responding judges put
"beyond a reasonable doubt" at 100%, another third put it at 90%
or 95%, and most of the rest put it at 80% or 85%. For the preponder-
ance standard, by contrast, over half put it at 55%, and most of the
rest put it between 60% and 75%. Questionnaires sent to jurors and
students produced slightly lower results for the reasonable doubt in-
struction, and rather higher results for the preponderance standard;
still, for most people the distinction was clear.4 7
There is some evidence, then, that factfinders can distinguish among
degrees of belief, and that rules about the burden of persuasion affect
the outcome of cases. It is at least plausible, therefore, that the require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt serves the purposes attributed
to it.
44. See H. K.,LvEN & H. ZEISEL, TiiE AIERICAN JURY vii (1966).
45. See Simon, Judges' Translations of Burdens of Proof into Statements of Prob-
ability, [1969] TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 103.
46. The judges may have been stating what they thought was correct legal doctrine,
rather than describing what they would do as judges.
47. See Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof, 5 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 319 (1971).
For the preponderance of the evidence standard the jurors and students produced a
mean value of 75N., compared with the judges' 55%. Id. at 325.
In another experiment, Simon presented a mock trial of a homicide to many student
juries; half were asked for a verdict on a reasonable doubt instruction, and half were
asked for a numerical estimate of the probability of guilt. By comparing her two groups,
she inferred that jurors were voting to convict when they thought the probability of
guilt as low as 74%. Simon, "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt"-An Experimental Attempt at
Quantification, 6 J. APPLIED BEHAVIORAL Scm. 203, 207 (1970). This figure, interestingly, is
about equal to the probability of guilt the students put down on their questionnaires as
the measure of the preponderance standard. Simon & Mahan, supra. Here too, of course,
the results are inconclusive, but the study suggests that despite Judge Hand, judges may
be able to make the distinction between the two standards of proof; it also suggests that
juries do it less well, at least under the instructions that are most frequently given. Cf.
Simon, supra at 207-08 (questioning "meaningfulness" of reasonable doubt instruction in
its present form).
While it appears that a fact finder can in general make distinctions concerning the
burden of persuasion, that ability may diminish if he is asked to apply several different
rules to different issues in the same case. If multiple rules generate confusion, that
would suggest not that the rules make no difference but that a single rule should
govern all issues in a case. The reported studies do not address this possible source of
confusion.
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II. An Exception for a Gratuitous Defense?
The reasonable doubt rule speaks only to the procedures for proving
facts, and not to the substantive law that determines what facts must
be proved. The Constitution imposes very few restraints on the sub-
stantive conditions for criminal responsibility, leaving the field largely
open to the policy choices of legislatures. Some commentators have
thought it anomalous that the Constitution should be read to impose
rigid requirements on the process of proof while remaining nearly
indifferent to the substance of what must be proved.-" Increasingly it
is argued that legislative power over substance must entail power over
procedure as well.49 Those who make this argument admit that if a
fact is a prerequisite to a constitutionally valid conviction, then that
fact must be proved by the government beyond a reasonable doubt.
Yet, they continue, if the legislature has the power to make a fact
irrelevant to guilt, then the legislature must also have the power to
choose its own rules for proving that fact. In particular, when the law
provides a defense that turns on proof of such a fact, that defense may
48. See, e.g., Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court, and the Substantive
Criminal Law-An Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 TEX. L. REv.
269, 283-85 (1977); Christie & Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law:
Another View, 1970 DUKE L.J. 919, 936-37.
49. It is no longer supposed, if it ever was, that procedural rules are neutral with
respect to substantive rights; all procedural rules have some impact on substantive rights,
and the impact may be more or less central to the purpose of the rule. From the percep-
tion of the relationship between substance and procedure, it may seem a small step to
argue that there is no distinction at all, and that power to regulate substantive law
necessarily entails power to regulate the associated procedures. See Grey, Procedural Fair-
ness and Substantive Rights, in DUE PROCESS 182 (NOMOS XVIII; J. Pennock & J. Chap-
man eds. 1977). But that step is not logically compelled, and this article suggests some
reasons to resist it, based oil arguments of policy and a fair reading of the constitutional
requirement of due process. For an exploration of limitations, constitutional and other-
wise, on the uses of procedure to achieve substantihe ends in civil litigation, see Cover,
For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718
(1975).
Although the distinction between substance and procedure has often proved trouble-
some, the vast literature on the subject generally agrees on the core of the distinction: a
procedural rule is centrally concerned with the management of litigation, and a substan-
tive rule is centrally concerned with "people's conduct at the stage of primary private
activity." H. HART & H. VECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 678
(1953). Many rules have both concerns, as a matter of rulemaker's intent or operative
effect. Such rules can only be classified in light of the purpose for which the classifica-
tion is made. See Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Law5, 42 YALE L.J.
333 (1933), reprinted in W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 154 (1942) (with addendum at 183-93); Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 693, 724-27 (1974). Despite its ambiguities, the distinction has seemed useful for
many purposes. Prominent among them is the constitutional decision to regulate "pro-
cess" more stringently than substantive law.
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be characterized as gratuitous, and therefore exempt from the require-
ment of proof by the government beyond a reasonable doubt.50
This analysis seems particularly attractive in its first aspect, con-
cerning the proof of a fact that is constitutionally required as a basis
for criminal conviction. For such a fact, at least, the legislature cannot
relax the rules of proof, because it would thereby accomplish (or ap-
50. The argument that gratuitous defenses are not governed by the constitutional
proof rules that ordinarily govern a criminal trial is analogous to the argument that
certain interests, called privileges, are not subject to the constitutional proof rules that
govern a civil proceeding to take property or liberty. The Constitution plainly imposes
a requirement of due process on such a proceeding, and that has long been understood
to entail notice and some form of hearing. E.g., Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax
Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926); Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). But some
interests, gratuitously conferred by the state, have been denominated privileges rather
than rights, and for that reason have been exempt from the requirements of fair fact-
finding. E.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (alien's
admission to U.S. a "privilege"; hearing not required if alien denied entry to U.S.).
The right-privilege distinction seemed for a time to be waning in importance, see Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV.
L. REv. 1439 (1968). Indeed, it was apparently rejected in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974), when six Justices took the position that a federal employee was constitutionally
entitled to a hearing before his employment could be terminated for cause. The six
agreed that though Congress could eliminate entirely the right to retain a job unless
there was "good cause" for dismissal, it could not grant that right and then under-
mine it by denying a hearing on the issue of good cause. "While the legislature may
elect not to confer a property interest in federal employment, it may not constitutionally
authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate
procedural safeguards." Id. at 167 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun, J.) (foot-
note omitted). The same view was expressed by Justice White in concurrence, id. at
177-86, and by Justice Marshall in dissent, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, id.
at 210-11. The six divided over the question whether the requirement was satisfied by the
ruditfientary hearing provided by the statute. Only three Justices thought it was within
the power of Congress "to enact what was essentially a legislative compromise" granting
substantive rights with procedural obstacles. Id. at 153-54 (Rehnquist, J., announcing
judgment of Court, joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, J.).
Some doubt has been cast on the Arnett principle by the subsequent decision in
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), holding that a state employee was not constitu-
tionally entitled to a hearing before his employment could be terminated for cause.
Perhaps Bishop is best understood as a case of extraordinary judicial deference, rising to
constitutional principle, when the relationship between a state and its employee is at
stake. See id. at 349-50 n.14; cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)
(federal minimum wage and maximum hour regulations as applied to state and
municipal employees beyond power under commerce clause and violative of Tenth
Amendment). Alternatively, Bishop may turn on a dubious narrow reading of the under-
lying state right, apart from the state-specified procedures. See Codd v. Velger, 97 S. Ct.
882, 883-84 (1977). These public employment cases have provoked considerable com-
mentary on the relationship between procedural rights and substantive rights (or
privileges). See, e.g., Grey, supra note 49; Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in
Procedural Due Process, in DUE PROCESS 182 (NOMOS XVIII; J. Pennock & J. Chapman
eds. 1977); Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977); Van
Alstyne, Cracks In "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in The Administra-
live State, id. at 445; Note, Statutory Entitlement and the Concept of Property, 86 YALE
L.J. 695 (1977).
The issues need not be resolved the same way in this context as in the criminal context,
where different values are at stake, but the similarity of argument is striking.
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proach) the prohibited result of removing the fact from significance
in the case. The Supreme Court adopted this line of reasoning in
Bailey v. Alabama,51 which concerned a conviction for the crime of
entering a contract for the performance of services with intent to
defraud. The statute defining the crime further provided that intent
to defraud could be rebuttably presumed from proof of failure to
perform. 52 The Court said that the statute would be unconstitutional
under the Thirteenth Amendment and the federal laws against peonage
if it punished a mere breach of contract for services, without requiring
a finding of fraudulent intent.53 Moreover, because the legislature had
no power to make the fact of fraudulent intent irrelevant to criminal
liability, the Court held that the legislature also had no power to relax
the rules for proving that fact.54 Instead of using a rebuttable presump-
tion of intent, the legislature could have reached the same result by
labelling lack of fraudulent intent an affirmative defense, with the
burden of persuasion on the defendant.55 The reasoning that in-
validated the Bailey presumption should also invalidate such an
evasion of the reasonable doubt rule. 6
But of course to say that stringent rules of proof clearly apply when
a fact is of constitutional significance is not to say they apply only in
that case. It remains to consider whether, and to what extent, the
Constitution regulates the factfinding process when it does not specify
the facts to be found. The theory of gratuitous defenses would hold
that it does not, that the reasonable doubt rule should apply only to
the proof of facts that are constitutionally necessary for liability or
guilt. According to this theory, any other fact may be seen as establish-
51. 219 U.S. 219, 239, 244-45 (1911).
52. See id. at 227-28.
53. Id. at 240-45.
54. Id. at 244-45. Essentially the same issues were analyzed in the same manner in
Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942).
55. It is difficult to determine exactly what form was taken by the Bailey presumption.
The strongest form of rebuttable presumption operates exactly like a rule putting
the burden of persuasion on the party who contests it. See Ashford & Risinger, supra
note 2, at 194-96. If the Bailey presumption was weaker in effect, and it was nonetheless
unconstitutional, then a fortiori a burden-shifting rule would also be unconstitutional.
56. The Supreme Court has indicated that there is a constitutionally significant dif-
ference between devices labelled "rebuttable presumptions" and devices labelled "affirma-
tive defenses", even when their effect is identical. In Patterson v. New York, 97 S. Ct.
2319 (1977), the Court distinguished Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 626 (1975), on the
ground that Mullaney involved a presumption which was unconstitutional, while Pat-
terson involved an affirmative defense which was permissible. See p. 1305 & n.25 supra.
The reason for making such a distinction is not elucidated, and perhaps cannot be.
Neither case, however, dealt with a defense that is constitutionally required. See pp.
1327-29 infra. Accordingly it remains open to conclude that the two devices are sufficiently
similar to require the same treatment when they operate to relax the rules for proving
a fact that is constitutionally required as a basis for conviction.
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ing a defense that is gratuitous, i.e., subject to complete elimination,
and therefore also subject to the partial elimination that results from
relaxing the rules of proof.
This argument is most often advanced in connection with a novel
or controversial defense. In such a case, the creation of a new defense
with modified proof rules may be seen as a compromise between those
who would grant the defense wholeheartedly, and those who would
not grant it at all.57 At least one example occurs in the Model Penal
Code. The drafters proposed to establish a new defense of reasonable
reliance on official advice.58 They also proposed to make this issue one
of only five in the whole Code for which the defendant is assigned the
burden of persuasion. 59 The purpose of shifting the burden was at least
in part to mitigate the force of the controversial defense and thereby
to make it more acceptable to opponents. 60 A controversy over the
proper scope of the substantive criminal law was resolved by means of
a procedural compromise.
Examples abound in the penal codes of the states. In 1967 New
York established a new defense to the charge of felony-murder. Under
the new law, a person cannot be convicted of felony-murder if he did
not personally kill, was not armed, and had no reasonable ground to
believe his co-felons were armed or likely to engage in physically
dangerous conduct."1 The New York Code also provides that the de-
fendant must prove the facts relevant to this defense by a preponder-
ance of evidence.6"
The New York Court of Appeals confronted a challenge to the
rules of proof for that defense in People v. Bornholdt.63 The de-
fendant argued that the new defense operates to redefine the crime
of felony-murder, and that he was entitled to proof excluding that
defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The court upheld the statute, in
57. See 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAws 17-19 (1970); Agata, Criminal Law, 27 SYRACUSE L. REv. 47, 58 (1976) (1975 Survey
of New York Law); Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of
Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506, 548 n.92 (1973);
Fletcher, supra note 21, at 928-29.
58. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b), (4).
59. The other four are: entrapment, id. § 2.13(2); in a prosecution for theft, the
value of the stolen property, reducing the grade of the crime, id. § 223.1(2)(b); in a
prosecution for deceptive business practices, lack of knowledge, id. § 224.7; in a prosecu-
tion of a corporation, diligent efforts of the manager to prevent offense, id. § 2.07(5).
60. Id. § 1.13, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); cf. A.L.I. Proceedings of the 32d
Annual Meeting 171 (1955) (unpublished).
61. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975).
62. Id. § 25.00(2).
63. 33 N.Y.2d 75, 305 N.E.2d 461, 350 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1973), cert. denied sub nora.
Victory v. New York, 416 U.S. 905 (1974).
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part on the ground that the defense was new, not constitutionally
required, and hence not subject to the reasonable doubt rule. On the
fair compromise theory, then, the power to withhold a defense includes
the power to grant it grudgingly.
This position was further elaborated by the New York Court of
Appeals in a case concerning another new defense to a charge of
murder, the defense of extreme emotional disturbance.0 4 In People v.
Patterson,65 the New York court again rejected a challenge to the
requirement that the defendant prove the facts relevant to his defense
by a preponderance of evidence. Although several grounds were in-
voked for the decision, a concurring opinion by Chief Judge Breitel
gave special emphasis to the novel and controversial character of the de-
fense, observing that "only those with a lack of historical perspective
would treat the affirmative defense as a hardening of attitudes in law
enforcement rather than as a civilized and sophisticated ameliora-
tion." 6 He reasoned that the legislature had the power to eliminate
the defense; they might well do so if required to subject it to rigid proof
rules; hence the court should recognize a power in the legislature to
modify the rules of proof. In affirming the judgment, the Supreme
Court quoted this argument approvingly, though without invoking it
as a ground for decision.17
The argument has some appeal, but it is seriously flawed in several
respects. First, both the text and the general pattern of constitutional
regulation point strongly to the contrary view, that the Constitution
regulates the factfinding process even when it does not specify the
facts to be found. Second, the device of adjusting rules of proof is an
inappropriate method of resolving controversy over the proper reach
of the substantive criminal law. Third, the device tends to make the
substantive commands of the criminal law obscure, and therefore more
difficult to obey. Finally, even if none of the above were true, the
64. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 1975).
65. 39 N.Y.2d 288, 347 N.E.2d 898, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1976), aff'd sub noma. Patterson
v. New York, 97 S. Ct. 2319 (1977).
66. Id. at 306, 347 N.E.2d at 910, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 584 (concurring opinion of Breitel,
C.J., necessary for disposition). As originally proposed by a state law reform commission,
the defense did not carry any assignment of the burden of persuasion to the defendant.
That modification was made between initial formulation and enactment. STATE OF NEW
YORK TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON REvisioN OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIMINAL CODE,
FOURTH INTERIM REPORT 36 (1965); see People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d at 301, 347 N.E.2d
at 906, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 581. The available history of the defense thus suggests, though it
does not compel, the conclusion that the change in rules of proof was necessary to secure
enactment. See Comment, Affirmative Defenses after Mullaney v. Wilbur: New York's
Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 171, 183 n.62 (1976).
67. 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2328 n.13 (1977).
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argument for special treatment of gratuitous defenses would be sub-
ject to serious question on the ground that it is exceedingly difficult
to keep within tolerable bounds. This section will consider each of
these matters in turn.
A. Constitutional Text and Pattern
The Constitution contains many provisions regulating trial pro-
cedure, and very few regulating the substance of criminal law. It
specifies, inter alia, that criminal charges shall be tried by jury, with
counsel, confrontation of adverse witnesses, and compulsory process
for obtaining defense witnesses; that the accused must be informed of
the nature of the charges and that he shall not be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. 5 These procedural
requirements apply to the trial of any crime, no matter how defined.
That approach, far from being anomalous, represents a sensible ad-
justment between the desire on the one hand to give the political
organs of government wide scope for making judgments about wise
social policy, and on the other hand to restrain their power in order
to protect individuals against injustice.
The Framers were well aware that they could maximize protection
against arbitrary criminal prosecutions by regulating the substance of
criminal law as well as its procedure. With respect to treason prosecu-
tions, which they perceived as a great threat to liberty, they did
exactly that. The Constitution expressly states the definition of treason,
as well as the method by which it may be proved. 9 But with respect
to prosecutions for other crimes, which seemed to pose a lesser threat,
the primary source of constitutional protection is the regulation of
procedure.7 0
The Constitution's relative lack of substantive restraints leaves a
legislature free, within extremely broad limits, to choose its criteria for
criminal conviction and punishment. It may establish a defense or
withhold it, specify precise grades of crime or create broad categories
with a wide range of possible sentences. But the structure and pattern
of constitutional regulation suggest that having made a substantive
68. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (jury and venue); id. amend. V (indictment, due
process); id. amend. VI (speedy public trial, jury, notice, confrontation, compulsory
process, counsel); id. amend. XIV § I (due process).
69. Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
70. See 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 163-64
(speech of James Wilson in Pa. Convention); id. at 309 (speech of Edmund Randolph in
Va. Convention).
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choice, a legislature cannot then undermine that substantive choice
with procedural manipulations.
It is possible, of course, that enforcing rigorous procedural require-
ments may increase rather than decrease the total quantity of in-
justice in the world. If a legislature is uncertain whether to create a
new defense, and it is barred from the method of procedural com-
promise, then it may abandon the proposal. Similarly, if a legislature
is considering a refined grading scheme, or a set of criteria for sen-
tencing, and it is obliged to surround any new substantive rights with
elaborate procedural safeguards, then it might prefer to leave the
substantive law unchanged. Legislators need not see their choices as so
limited. But even if they did, a Constitution designed to promote both
fair procedures and fair substance might sensibly focus primarily on
fair procedures, and rely on the political process to remedy substantive
unfairness. For substantive injustice is more likely than procedural
injustice to attract the attention of the political organs and to provoke
a response.7'
A single example cannot prove the point, but perhaps it can make
it more plausible. The Iowa legislature decided that it was inappro-
priate to punish as a dealer a person who transferred narcotics as an
accommodation, without intent to profit or to induce addiction. A
statute provided that such a person should be punished as a minor
offender, like a possessor, rather than as a felon.72 But the law also
provided that the defendant must prove the accommodation defense
by clear and convincing evidence. The result of that procedural ar-
rangement was, of course, to make the defense relatively inaccessible;
some people who in fact made accommodation sales were probably
punished as dealers. But that result was masked, and any public
71. The argument that substantive matters are especially suited for political deter-
mination is the other side of the coin from the familiar argument that procedural matters,
because of their technical nature, are especially suited to judicial determination. See,
e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting): "Insofar as [procedural due process] is technical law, it must be a specialized
responsibility within the competence of the judiciary on which they do not bend before
political branches of the Government, as they should on matters of policy which com-
prise substantive law." Justice Frankfurter frequently proclaimed the wisdom of a con-
stitutional scheme that required judicial deference to the political branches on substan-
tive matters, and judicial control of procedural matters, whether through the enforce-
ment of constitutional requirements or through the exercise of the supervisory power
over lower federal courts. See, e.g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945)
(separate opinion) ("The history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the
history of procedure."); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943) ("The history
of liberty has largely been tie history of observance of procedural safeguards.")
72. IowA CODE ANN., § 204.410 (West Supp. 1977). This provision was among the many
additions and modifications made by the Iowa legislature when it adopted the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act in 1971.
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response with it, by the procedural arrangement. A few years after the
statute was passed, the state supreme court declared the burden-of-
proof rule unconstitutional, on the ground that it denied the de-
fendant his right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.7 3 Barred from
the method of procedural compromise, the legislature might then have
decided to eliminate the defense altogether. It did not do so. Instead
it retained the defense and adopted the judicially imposed requirement
of proof by the government beyond a reasonable doubt.74 Perhaps it
was politically less acceptable to eliminate the defense explicitly, by a
highly visible legislative decision about the proper treatment of people
who make accommodation sales, than to burden the defense by a
technical rule of procedure that might invisibly accomplish the same
result.
In this respect, the constitutional requirement of procedural regular-
ity is similar in strategy to the constitutional requirement of equal
protection of the laws. The requirement of equal protection does not
ensure the wisdom or fairness of substantive law. A denial of equal
protection can be remedied by treating everyone equally badly, or by
treating everyone equally well. A legislature that is ambivalent about
extending a substantive right might choose to compromise by extend-
ing it to part of the population. Because the requirement of equal
protection at least sometimes prevents that sort of compromise,7 5 it
might push a legislature to abandon a wise policy rather than extend
it equally to everyone. For this reason the wisdom of requiring
equality, like the wisdom of requiring procedural uniformity, might
well be questioned.
It seems clear, however, that the strategy of the equal protection
clause was to impose a requirement of equality, despite that possible
outcome. One ground for that choice may be the judgment that the
bare fact of inequality is a greater evil than any other likely evil.
Another ground for the choice may be the judgment that a require-
ment of equality tends to make serious substantive evils unlikely,
without foreclosing legislative options. Under a requirement of equal-
ity, a legislature that would inflict a harm on one group must be
prepared to do so to others similarly situated. Barred from certain
73. State v. Monroe, 236 N.V.2d 24 (Iowa 1975), overruling State v. Victor, 208 N.V.2d
894 (Iowa 1973).
74. IowA CODE ANN. § 204A10 (West Special Pamphlet 1977).
75. Some compromises of precisely this sort are upheld on the ground that a legislature
is entitled to proceed "one step at a time." E.g., Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 364 (1971);
McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). The tension between
this rationale and the requirement of equal protection is noted in P. BREST, PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 558-65 (1975).
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kinds of compromise, a legislature must choose substantive policies
for their effect on a whole constituency.
Similarly, the Constitution imposes rules to govern the process of
factfinding, despite the possibility that the rules might inhibit a
legislature from making wise substantive decisions about what facts
must be found. Iowa must decide whether it wishes to treat the ac-
commodation seller differently from the dealer. It cannot compromise
by selecting a few accommodation sellers for favored treatment. The
equal protection clause prevents a compromise that would extend the
defense only to white accommodation sellers, or to every fifth person
who raises the defense. Similarly, the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt prevents a compromise that would extend the defense
only to those accommodation sellers who are identified by a rule for
factfinding less rigorous than the rule that generally governs fact-
finding in a criminal case.
It is consistent with the general pattern of constitutional regula-
tion, then, to conclude that the reasonable doubt rule applies to the
proof of facts that establish gratuitous defenses, as well as to facts that
establish substantive constitutional rights. In this respect as in others,
the Constitution allocates broad discretion to the political branches
in substantive matters, where their competence is greatest, and limits
their decisions largely in a nonsubstantive manner. These limits on
compromise are designed to promote full and fair political resolution
of the substantive issues. This form of regulation is a characteristic
feature of our constitutional structure, and not an anomaly that ought
to give rise to exceptions to the constitutional rules.
B. An Inappropriate Form of Compromise
Broad application of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt operates to foreclose certain kinds of compromise in the for-
mulation of criminal law policy. In general, compromise is a desirable
and indeed essential part of the lawmaking process. If this reading of
the constitutional requirement seemed to foreclose sensible legislative
options for no good reason, that would count heavily for a different
and more felicitous reading. But the kind of compromise prohibited
by the reasonable doubt rule is less satisfactory than other forms of
compromise that remain available, and therefore its loss is no ground
for concern.
A change in rules of proof may sometimes be suitable as a response
to concerns about difficulties of proof or access to evidence. That
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possibility will be considered below.76 But the circumstance that the
defense may be characterized as gratuitous does not aid in resolving
arguments about the proper rules of proof. The gratuitous character
of a defense has the effect of leaving room for substantive disagree-
ments about its worth. But it remains to consider what sort of com-
promise is best suited to resolve those disagreements. One form of
compromise would create the defense and qualify it by relaxing or
removing the government's burden of persuasion. An alternative form
of compromise would take an intermediate stand on the substantive
question of prohibited conduct, finding some narrow definition for
the new defense. Either a substantive compromise or one that alters
the rule of proof has the effect of reducing the number of people for
whom the defense results in acquittal. But the substantive compromise
has the advantage of being more accessible than a rule of proof to the
public and to legislators and hence more likely to receive continuing
scrutiny. And it has the further advantage of preserving the values
served by the reasonable doubt rule.
An example may clarify the argument. Suppose that a legislature
has decided to prohibit the possession of certain narcotic drugs. Sup-
pose further that there is a controversy over a proposal to exempt from
punishment those who possess narcotics solely for their personal use.
Proponents and opponents of the defense might well seek an in-
termediate position that would recognize a defense for some, but not
all, of those who possess for personal use. One possibility for substantive
compromise would be to exempt from punishment only those who
possess specified small quantities for personal use. Another possibility
would be to exempt only those who possess for personal use in the
privacy of their homes. Each of these compromises, by redefining the
prohibited conduct, seeks to accommodate differing views about the
harm caused, or the harm threatened, or the culpability of the actor in
various situations. This substantive compromise attempts to limit the
defense to those who are least culpable, or least harmful, or otherwise
least suitable for criminal sanctions in the view of opponents of the
defense, and at the same time most centrally deserving of the defense
in the view of its proponents. 77
76. See Part III infra.
77. A compromise that takes the form of redefining the crime may of course be
motivated by evidentiary considerations. In each of the examples in text, the group might
be singled out for the defense precisely because their claim of possession for personal use
is thought most likely to be true. Nevertheless, if the compromise is forced into the
form of an intermediate position on substantive liability, then it avoids two of the
principal targets of the reasonable doubt rule: the opportunity for arbitrariness in the
decision of individual cases by prosecutor or factfinder, and the low visibility of a com-
promise framed in procedural terms.
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A substantive disagreement about whether to recognize a defense
amounts to a disagreement about whether the person with the pro-
posed defense is less suitable than other offenders for specified criminal
sanctions. By shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant, a
legislature limits the defense to those for whom the evidence is most
abundant. That group, however, is not necessarily the least culpable,
least harmful, or least deterrable. For there is no reason to think that
the continuum of culpability, harm, or deterrability bears any rela-
tionship to the continuum of available evidence. The person for whom
the evidence is strongest may not be the person whose claim, if be-
lieved, has the strongest relationship to the policies behind the defense.
A disagreement about the proper scope of the substantive criminal
law can be compromised by an intermediate definition of the facts
that constitute crimes and defenses. Tinkering with the reasonable
doubt rule, which determines when to believe a defendant's version
of the facts, requires an explanation in terms of the purposes of that
rule. But those purposes are no less relevant to factfinding when a
controversial gratuitous defense is at issue than they are to the de-
termination of any other fact in a criminal case. Indeed, any con-
troversy over the defense may enhance the threat to the values the
reasonable doubt rule was designed to protect.
If the rule is seen as a corrective to the danger of pervasive bias on
the part of the factfinder against criminal defendants, then the danger
of that bias may be especially acute in the case of a defendant claiming
the protection of a controversial defense. The rule may also be seen
as a deliberate introduction of bias in favor of criminal defendants,
reflecting a general judgment about the relative costs of errors and
protecting individual defendants against arbitrary or discriminatory
use of the government's prosecutorial power. A legislature uncertain
about the merits of a proposed defense might reasonably wish to
change its assessment of the relative costs of errors. But a constitutional
valuation of the relative costs of errors cannot be avoided by legisla-
tive fiat. So long as the factual determination has the function and
consequences that characterize other issues in a criminal case, such as
enhanced stigma and an increased period of potential incarceration,
the reasons for the constitutional rule remain. The costs of erroneous
convictions and erroneous acquittals are not different by virtue of the
gratuitous character of the defense. Moreover, the danger that those
costs will be imposed arbitrarily against selected unpopular defendants
may be especially acute in the case of a controversial defense.
Finally, the rule may be seen as serving various symbolic functions
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that require its application to those aspects of a case that are distinc-
tively criminal in character. As in the case of the error calculus, neither
the gratuitous character of a defense nor its controversial character
can rid it of significance if it marks a distinction with the function
and consequences of other issues in a criminal case. None of the pur-
poses of the reasonable doubt rule is affected by the gratuitous
character of a defense, or by a controversy over policy that provides
the impetus for compromise. An exception designed solely for the
purpose of compromise would subvert the policies of the rule, with-
out accomplishing an appropriate compromise of substantive dis-
agreements. 78
C. Truth-in-Labeling
A third reason for insisting that the gratuitous character of a defense
is no ground for exempting it from constitutional rules of proof has
already been suggested by the earlier discussion. Although popular
understanding of the substantive law is notoriously deficient, rules
about proof at trial are even less accessible to popular understanding
than rules about conduct in society. One consequence of that fact is
that it is somewhat more reasonable in the case of substantive law
than in the case of rules of proof to rely on political processes to
evaluate and revise the law. Another consequence is that unusual
rules of proof, even more than unusual substantive laws, are likely to
trap an unsuspecting public into reliance on a false idea of the law.
78. An interesting variation on the compromise theme appears in State v. Shoffner, 31
Wis. 2d 412, 425-27, 143 N.W.2d 458, 464-65 (1966). By statute the reasonable doubt rule
governs the insanity defense in Wisconsin, and the defense is defined in relatively
narrow terms. Shoffner held that a defendant could elect instead a broader definition of
the defense, if he would agree to a rule assigning him the burden of persuasion. Thus
the state offers a compromise to each individual defendant, rather than making a single
compromise of general application.
From a systemic point of view, this arrangement suffers the same infirmities as a
generally applicable compromise in the form of modified proof rules. The defendant's
election does not reduce the risk of bias, the costs of errors, or the symbolic importance
of proof rules; nor does it enhance the public visibility of the compromise. The reasons
for rejecting a legislative compromise in the form of a modified proof rule ought to
count against this sort of compromise as well.
Because this compromise is brought about by the defendant's election, however, the
Wisconsin court was able to treat it as a waiver of rights by defendant, and therefore
valid, rather than as a rule of proof imposed by the state, and therefore invalid. Seen as
a waiver, the Wisconsin arrangement may seem no more problematic a form of com-
promise than a negotiated guilty plea. But the Court has found reason to distinguish
between the waiver of all trial rights by guilty plea, and the attempt to waive some such
rights while proceeding to trial. In the latter case, waiver may be foreclosed by institu-
tional interests in the integrity of the factfinding process. See Singer v. United States,
380 U.S. 24 (1965) (upholding limits on waiver of jury trial). Similar considerations
should bar the Wisconsin arrangement.
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The criminal law is meant to operate as a guide to conduct, an-
nouncing serious penalties for certain acts, announcing minor penal-
ties for other acts, and offering people the opportunity to avoid sanc-
tions altogether by avoiding prohibited conduct. Suppose that a state
makes possession of more than one ounce of marijuana a major crime,
possession of less than an ounce a minor crime, and presence in a
house containing marijuana no crime at all. With that understanding
of the law, a person might reasonably choose to engage in the innocent
conduct of associating with marijuana smokers, and he might further
choose to engage in the minor crime of small-scale possession. But
depending on the rules of proof, either choice might be riskier than
it seems. If the defendant has the burden of persuasion on the issue of
quantity, for example, then he runs a substantial risk of conviction
for a major crime by engaging in the minor crime of small-scale pos-
session. Likewise, if presence in a house containing marijuana raises
a presumption of possession, and the defendant has the burden of
persuasion on that issue, then he runs a substantial risk of conviction
for possession by engaging in the noncriminal conduct of associating
with possessors. It is reasonable to expect people to guide their con-
duct by the prohibitions and penalties of the substantive law. It is
rather less reasonable to expect them to know about the subtleties of
rules of proof. Therefore, assigning the burden of persuasion to the
defendant, even on a gratuitous defense, tends to deny citizens the
fair notice that is constitutionally required of the criminal law.7 9
This is an argument for truth-in-labeling, and in principle it can be
met by a system of better labels. It is possible at least to imagine a
widespread public information campaign, designed to make proof
rules as familiar to citizens as the substantive parts of the law.80 In the
ordinary course of events, however, such a campaign is unlikely to
occur. Moreover, it is questionable whether even a very extensive
campaign could easily overcome the widely shared expectation that
defendants are treated as innocent until proven guilty, and that the
prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. That
79. The same argument can be made, with somewhat less force, about a rule that
merely reduces the government's burden to a requirement of proof by a preponderance
of evidence.
This is not to suggest that the constitutional requirement of fair notice generally
extends to procedural matters. Rather, it is to recognize that a change in the rule
regulating the burden of persuasion can function much like a change in the substantive
law. This attribute of rules of proof makes them candidates for achieving substantive
compromise; it also makes them candidates for the concerns behind the requirement
that people be given fair notice of the substantive commands of the criminal law.
80. Which, after all, are perhaps not as familiar as the ban on vague criminal statutes
might suggest.
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widely shared expectation poses a serious problem of fair notice for
any attempt to adjust the rules of proof that govern the trial of a
criminal case.
D. The Slippery Slope
A final objection to the argument for special treatment of gratuitous
defenses is that the argument is exceedingly difficult to confine within
reasonable bounds. The exception for gratuitous defenses is so large
that it threatens to engulf the entire requirement of procedural due
process. First, if the reasonable doubt rule applies only to facts that
are constitutionally necessary for conviction, then it applies to a
very small part of any criminal case, for very few facts are constitu-
tionally necessary as a basis for criminal conviction. Second, the reason-
ing that would exempt gratuitous defenses from the reasonable doubt
rule is equally applicable to other constitutional requirements of fair
procedure as well.
1. What issues are not "Gratuitous Defenses"?
A defense is gratuitous in the sense of this discussion if the legislature
has the power to eliminate it, and to redefine the crime to include the
conduct described by the defense. By that definition, any graded series
of crimes entails a set of gratuitous defenses, if the legislature could
have replaced the graded series with a single broadly defined crime.
Any issue that distinguishes one degree of crime from another in such
a series is a gratuitous defense.
For example, Congress has specified five grades of federal bank
robbery: taking less than $100, taking more than $100, using force
and violence, using a dangerous weapon, and involving incidental
death or kidnapping.81 Congress could instead have created a single
crime of bank robbery, with a wide range of possible sentences, and
failed to specify the criteria that aggravate or mitigate the crime. In
the existing statutory scheme, then, each fact that distinguishes one
crime from another can be regarded as a gratuitous defense that
Congress has the power to eliminate. On the theory of gratuitous de-
fenses it would follow that under existing law the defendant could
be convicted and punished for the most serious form of bank robbery
81. Robbery of an amount under $100 has a maximum penalty of $1000 and one year,
18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1970); if the amount is over S100, the maximum penalty is $5000
and ten years, id.; if force and violence are used, $5000 and twenty years, id. § 2113(a);
if a dangerous weapon is used, $10,000 and twenty-five years, id. § 2113(d); if there is death
or kidnapping, there is a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years, id. § 2113(e). See
United States v. Canty, 469 F.2d 114, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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on proof that he robbed a bank, unless he proved the facts that reduce
his crime to a lower degree, i.e., that there was no death, dangerous
weapon, force, or theft over $100.
Or consider the various crimes of assault and homicide as a graded
series, ranging from the most trivial assault, in which the defendant
neither intends nor inflicts serious injury, to the most serious homicide,
in which he both intends and inflicts death. It is likely that a legisla-
ture could, consistent with the Constitution, substitute for those
crimes the single crime of Personal Attack, with a wide range of pos-
sible sentences. For an adherent to the theory of gratuitous defenses, it
would follow that a legislature could authorize conviction and punish-
ment for that crime on proof of a trivial assault, with the burden on
the defendant to establish the mitigating defenses of the victim's
survival, his freedom from injury, or the defendant's lack of intent to
harm or injure.
Indeed, the theory of gratuitous defenses reaches not only the facts
that distinguish one grade of crime from another, but also the facts
that distinguish crime from related conduct that, while constitution-
ally punishable, is generally thought too trivial to punish. Thus, in a
state that has eliminated the most trivial assaults from the catalog of
crimes, it would nevertheless be permissible to authorize conviction
for Personal Attack on proof of a noncriminal unconsented touching,
with the burden on the defendant to prove the mitigating facts that
would reduce or eliminate his crime.
In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 2 the Supreme Court emphatically rejected
that view in the context of the traditional scheme for grading homi-
cides. Under the law of Maine, the defendant had the burden of
persuasion on the issue of provocation, the fact that distinguished
murder from manslaughter. In defending that arrangement, Maine
claimed that the state had the power to eliminate the defense of
provocation; in fact, it had done so-by collapsing the two offenses
into the single crime of felonious homicide, retaining provocation only
as a criterion for mitigation of sentence. The Supreme Court first
rejected the distinction between a criterion for mitigation of sentence
and a criterion for reducing the grade of crime, observing quite cor-
rectly that the consequences of the two alternative arrangements were
identical and the formal distinction should have no constitutional
significance.83 The Court then held that Maine could not require the
82. 421 U.S. 624 (1976).
83. Id. at 696-99.
The equivalence between mitigating the severity of sentence and reducing the grade of
crime was especially clear in Mullaney, because the statutory scheme, although char-
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defendant to prove provocation, because the concerns of Winship
were fully implicated. The consequence of an erroneous determina-
tion on the issue of provocation would be an erroneous murder con-
viction subjecting the defendant to much more stigma and potential
incarceration than would result from a conviction for manslaughter.
That consequence means that an error is too serious to permit the
State to exempt the issue from the rigors of the Winship rule.
8 4
One commentator has suggested that Mullaney should be under-
stood as holding, sub silentio, not that Winship applies to gratuitous
defenses, but rather that the defense of provocation is not gratuitous.
acterized by the state court as a sentencing scheme, operated exactly like a traditional
division of conduct into grades of crime. The fact at issue, provocation, concerned the
seriousness of the crime; it was determined by the jury at the time of conviction; and a
finding against the defendant had substantial legislatively specified consequences for both
the potential period of incarceration and the label and stigma attached to the conduct
(murder or manslaughter). As a result, the risk of bias, the costs of error, and the
symbolic status of the decision were identical to those in a determination of the correct
grade of crime.
When the fact at issue lacks one or more of these attributes, some might argue that
the reasonable doubt rule is inapplicable. Statutes that authorize enhanced punishment
for habitual or dangerous offenders sometimes call for factfinding by the judge rather
than the jury, and the facts may concern the defendant's character rather than the
seriousness of his crime; the facts are legislatively specified, however, with fixed con-
sequences that involve labeling and stigma as well as incarceration. Under the analysis
presented here, such factfinding should be subject to the reasonable doubt rule. When
the fact at issue is the existence of prior convictions, most courts agree that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is required. See Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U.L.
Ray. 332, 341-42 (1965) (citing cases). When the fact at issue is the defendant's dangerous-
ness, there is more division of authority. Compare United States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp.
874, 882-85 (W.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 529 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1975) (en-
hanced sentence for "dangerous special offender," preponderance standard unconstitu-
tional, reasonable doubt required) with United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326, 334 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976) (preponderance standard constitutional); United
States v. Holt, 397 F. Supp. 1397, 1399-1400 (N.D. Tex. 1975), rev'd in pertinent part on
other grounds sub nor. United States v. Bailey, 537 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1976) (same) and
United States v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184, 1193-94 (7th Cir. 1977) (preponderance standard
constitutional for proof of dangerousness but reasonable doubt might be required for
proof of status as a recidivist special offender). See generally Note, The Constitutionality
of Statutes Permitting Increased Sentences for Habitual or Dangerous Criminals, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 356 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Two-Tiered Sentencing]; id. at 383-84 & n.140
(discussion of standard of proof).
In traditional sentencing, the factfinding is often performed by the judge, at some time
after conviction; the facts may concern the character of the defendant rather than the
seriousness of the crime; moreover, the relevant facts may not be legislatively specified,
or they may lack fixed consequences. Informal procedures for such factfinding have been
upheld against constitutional attack, Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), and
that holding has been understood by some to include exemption from the reasonable
doubt rule. See Two-Tiered Sentencing, supra at 363. Even in such factfinding, however,
the reasons for the reasonable doubt rule are often present: the danger of bias against
the defendant, the costs of error in terms of both stigma and incarceration, and the
symbolic status of the decision. When the reasons are present, the rule should apply.
See generally Fox & O'Brien, Fact Finding for Sentencers, 10 MELBOURNE U.L. REV. 163
(1975).
84. 421 U.S. at 699-701, 703-04.
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Only if Maine is constitutionally prohibited from withholding the
defense of provocation, he argues, is Maine constitutionally prohibited
from assigning the defendant the burden of persuasion on that issue.8 z
That view of Mullaney seems plainly wrong. Very little support can
be found for the proposition that the defense of provocation, or any
other defense, is constitutionally required. As commentators have long
lamented, the Court has assiduously avoided the development of doc-
trine concerning the constitutional limits of the substantive criminal
law.86 Moreover, though it would be valuable to develop a framework
for considering the question, there is no reason for any resulting theory
to entail a requirement for the particular defense that was at issue in
Mullaney.
One pertinent strand of existing case law indicates that the Con-
stitution may require a defense for the person who violates the law
without any volition or intent. Thus it is unconstitutional to punish
a person for the status of addiction to narcotic drugs,87 and it would
be unconstitutional to punish for public drunkenness a man who
could control neither his drunkenness nor his appearance in public.88
These cases suggest that some form of the insanity defense is con-
stitutionally required,80 and perhaps also some form of the defenses
of duress and self-defense. They also suggest that Maine could not
create a crime of felonious homicide that encompassed all killings,
without regard to intent or state of mind. But no elaboration of this
principle would prevent Maine from eliminating the defense of
provocation. Even a provoked homicide entails a mental element-
recklessness, at least-that is generally deemed sufficient for criminal
liability.
A second pertinent strand of case law indicates that the Constitution
embodies a requirement of proportionality in punishment, so that
extremely serious punishments cannot be inflicted for relatively minor
85. Tushnet, Constitutional Limitation of Substantive Criminal Law: An Examination
of the Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U.L. REv. 775 (1975).
86. See, e.g., Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. Cr. REv. 107.
87. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
88. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 548 (1968) (vhite, J., concurring; necessary for
disposition).
89. This is the view of the few courts that have considered the question under state
constitutions. Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931) (per curiam); see id. at
155-71, 132 So. at 582-88 (Ethridge, J., concurring) (discussion of unconstitutionality of
law); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910). The argument is not that a
separately labeled insanity defense is required, but that the Constitution requires acquit-
tal of many people who are acquitted under present law on the ground of insanity. If
the insanity defense were abolished, it would still be necessary to determine whether the
defendant had a constitutionally sufficient mental state. See Goldstein & Katz, Abolish
the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not? 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963).
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crimes. 90 It is at least arguable that the principle requires some re-
finement in the legislative grading of crimes. For if a statute defines a
single crime that encompasses both minor and serious offenses, and
prescribes a broad range of permissible penalties, then the minor of-
fender is exposed to the possibility of a disproportionately severe
sentence. The principle of proportionality may prohibit even that
exposure. For crimes that carry severe sentences, then, the Constitu-
tibn may require some defenses of degree-of minor intent, or minor
harm, or extenuating circumstances of some other sort. But this
principle would not specify the appropriate criteria for grading, and it
need not prevent Maine from punishing a provoked homicide as
seriously as an unprovoked one.
In fact Mullaney says nothing to support the view that the defense
of provocation is constitutionally required. It merely notes the serious
consequences that have been made to turn on the distinction between
murder and manslaughter, and the resulting importance of protecting
the defendant against an erroneous determination. On a straight-
forward reading, the case seems to hold that if a fact is important
enough for serious criminal consequences to turn on it, then it is
important enough to require proof by the government beyond a
reasonable doubt.
2. What procedural rights are not vulnerable to this exception?
One result of the theory of gratuitous defenses is to restrict the ap-
plication of the reasonable doubt rule to proof of a very small set of
facts. A second, and perhaps more surprising, result is to impose that
same restriction on other constitutional requirements of fair procedure
as well. For if the gratuitous character of a defense is sufficient to
authorize a legislature to compromise away one of the Constitution's
procedural rules, it is hard to see what protects the other rules from
90. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-82 (1910) (cruel and unusual punish-
ment to impose 15 years hard labor in chains and perpetual loss of civil rights for
falsifying an official document); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903) (not cruel to
impose 10 years imprisonment for conspiracy to defraud). This principle of proportion-
ality has apparently been approved by a majority of the Supreme Court considering the
constitutionality of capital punishment; the Justices divided only on the appropriate
manner to apply the principle to the cases at hand. See Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861,
2866-70 (1977) (White, J.; plurality opinion) (death excessive for rape); id. at 2870-72
(Powell, J., concurring and dissenting); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 &
nA0 (1976) (Stewart, J.; plurality opinion) (reserving question for felony-murder); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176, 187 & n.35 (1976) (Stewart, J.; plurality opinion) (death not
excessive for murder, expressly reserving question for other crimes such as rape, kid-
napping, armed robbery); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279-81, 300-05 (1972) (Brennan,
J., concurring); id. at 456-61 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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similar compromise. But that result would squarely contradict a large
body of established law.
For example, the defendant in a criminal case is constitutionally
entitled to adequate advance notice of the principal facts at issue, so
that he may prepare to meet the charges against him.91 That require-
ment of fair notice extends to the crime as actually defined by the
legislature, and not merely to the facts that are constitutional pre-
requisites for conviction. A defendant cannot be tried and convicted
of murder after notice that he has been charged with assault, even
though death of the victim is not a prerequisite to a constitutionally
valid conviction. The defense that the victim survived may be gratui-
tous, but it nevertheless marks a distinction that warrants mention in a
constitutionally adequate indictment or information. It is quite true,
of course, that some facts at issue can be omitted from a valid indict-
ment or information; among these are many matters commonly
characterized as defenses.9 2 But when notice is unnecessary for these
matters, that is because omitting them from the charge is thought to
pose no substantial likelihood of unfair surprise, and not because they
are constitutionally gratuitous.
A similar argument can be made for each of the other procedural re-
quirements established by the Constitution to govern the process of
factfinding in a criminal case. The right to counsel could hardly be
limited to the part of a criminal trial concerned with facts that are
constitutionally required for guilt. Nor could the right to confront
witnesses, the right to compulsory process, or the right to jury trial.
Each of these procedural requirements is subject to limitations, but
those limitations must be justified with respect to the purposes of the
rule. The gratuitous character of a defense has no relevance to the
purposes of any of these rules. Therefore, when the considerations
behind the rule point toward its application, it is no contrary argu-
ment that the fact in issue is within the power of the legislature to
remove from the case.
91. In federal prosecutions, this right is secured both by the Sixth Amendment right
"to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation," and by the Fifth Amend-
ment right to indictment by a grand jury. In state prosecutions, the right to a grand
jury indictment has been held inapplicable, Hurtado v. California, 100 U.S. 516 (1884),
and many states proceed by information instead. But no matter what form the charge
takes, it must provide adequate notice to the defendant, as a matter of due process. Cole
v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937). See
generally Scott, Fairness in Accusation of Crime, 41 MINN. L. REv. 509 (1957).
92. On the requisites of an adequate indictment or information, see, e.g., 5 R. ANDER-
SON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 2054-68 (1957); 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE fff 7.01-07 (2d ed. 1976); L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL
194-265 (1947).
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III. Problems of Proof
The reasonable doubt rule implements a strong constitutional
preference for avoiding errors that favor the government in a criminal
case. Given a fallible factfinder, the only way to guard against errors
that favor the government is to reduce the chance of correct decisions
that favor the government as well, by using a cautious rule of decision
that tilts the scales against the government.93 Nevertheless, the cost in
errors favoring the defendant may seem high, and to reduce that cost
courts and legislatures have sometimes approved exceptions to the
reasonable doubt rule.
In two situations, the risk of error favoring the defendant has been
thought sufficiently great to warrant an exception to the reasonable
doubt rule. First, the defendant is sometimes required to prove a
claim on the ground that he has better access to the principal evidence
than does the government; his superior access to evidence gives him an
opportunity to mislead the factfinder by withholding that evidence. 94
Second, the defendant is sometimes required to prove a claim on the
93. The literature of signal detection theory provides a helpful framework for con-
sidering the general problem of a fallible observer who attempts to detect signals, some-
times giving false alarms and sometimes missing true signals. See generally D. GREEN &
J. SwErs, SIGNAL DETECTION THEORY AND PSYCHOPHYSICS (1966). The number and kinds of
errors are determined by three independent factors: the inherent detectability of the
signal by the observer, the decision criterion used by the observer to bias his results, and
the frequency with which signals are actually given (called the a priori probability). See
id. at 11-52.
The detectability of the signal specifies the extent to which it is possible for the
observer to get results better than chance. See id. at 30-52. The detectability of the
signal depends on the strength of the signal and the skill of the observer, and it is in-
dependent of any particular rule of decision. See id. at 110-15. With fixed signal strength
and observing skill, the observer can control his errors only by choosing a rule of deci-
sion. He can seek to minimize all errors, in which case he will always choose the answer
that seems even slightly more likely, see id. at 23; the proportion of false alarms among
his errors will be determined by the detectability of the signal and by the frequency of
signals among the observed events. Or he can choose a biased criterion in order to reduce
or increase the chance of false alarms. See id. at 20-27. In general, using a biased
criterion is likely to increase the total number of errors. This is because it departs from
the observer's best efforts at accuracy, and therefore when it reverses some false deci-
sions it must reverse more true ones. See id. at 409-10.
94. E.g., Commonwealth v. Pauley, 331 N.E.2d 901, 909 (Mass.), appeal dismissed, 423
U.S. 887 (1975) (lack of personal participation as defense to charge that one's car was
used with intent to evade payment of toll); People v. Kirkpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 17, 25-27,
295 N.E.2d 753, 757-59, 343 N.Y.S.2d 70, 76-78 (1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 948
(1973) (lack of scienter as defense to charge of selling obscene material); People v. Felder,
39 App. Div. 2d 373, 376, 334 N.Y.S.2d 992, 995 (1972), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 747, 297 N.E.2d
522, 344 N.Y.S.2d 643, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 948 (1973) (unloaded gun as defense to
first degree robbery). But see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701-02 (1975) (seemingly
rejecting argument relying upon defendant's greater access to evidence); accord, Turner
v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 407-08 n.8 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 45
(1969); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943).
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ground that it is especially unusual, and therefore especially unlikely
to be true; in such circumstances even an apparently persuasive show-
ing is suspect on statistical grounds.95
The nature and the purposes of the reasonable doubt rule cast
suspicion on any effort to increase overall accuracy. The rule is
designed to tilt the scales against conviction, expressly requiring an
acquittal in close cases even when conviction is somewhat more likely
the correct result. A principle that would depart from the rule in the
interests of accuracy does not simply pit some other value against the
values embodied by the reasonable doubt rule. It opposes the rule on
its own terms.
Indeed, there would be almost nothing left of the reasonable doubt
rule if the defendant could be required to prove all facts for which he
has the best access to evidence, or all facts that are statistically im-
probable. Most facts at issue in a criminal case fall in at least one of
those categories. The defendant's access to evidence is greater than
that of the prosecution for any issue about his own behavior or state
of mind. And the defendant's version of the facts is statistically im-
probable for most issues if the prosecutor is reasonably effective in
selecting strong cases for trial. It may well be that most persons charged
with crime are guilty, in which case the probability argument would
justify assigning the entire burden of proving innocence to the de-
fendant in a criminal case.
If the interest in accurate factfinding is to support an exception to
the reasonable doubt rule, and not its rejection, then that exception
95. E.g., Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 183-84 (1925) (legal importation and
lack of scienter as defense to possessing opium); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 598-99
(1904) (lack of knowledge as defense to possession of policy paraphernalia); Buzynski v.
Oliver, 538 F.2d 6, 10 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 503 (1976) (insanity).
Although analytically distinct, the two arguments are frequently invoked concurrently
in a single case. For example, in Rossi v. United States, 289 U.S. 89 (1933), the Court
confronted a challenge to a federal statute that prohibited possession of an unregistered
still, and allocated to the defendant the burden of persuasion on the issue of registration.
Upholding the statute, the Court observed that registration of the still was unlawful and
hence extremely unlikely. Id. at 91. Moreover, if the still were in fact registered the de-
fendant would possess the documents that would most effectively prove registration. Id.
at 91-92. It is unclear whether Rossi would be decided the same way today. In sub-
sequent cases the Court has held that due process imposes stringent limitations on the
use of presumptive devices in criminal cases. Even a permissive inference, which does not
shift the burden of persuasion, is required to meet some test of persuasiveness, and the
Court has suggested without deciding that the test is persuasiveness beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843-46 (1973); Turner v. United States,
396 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 & n.64 (1969). If that
demanding standard governs the use of permissive inferences, it should a fortiori govern
the use of the kind of presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion. Even if a
permissive inference is governed by a less demanding standard, a cloud remains over the
more potent burden-shifting device.
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must rest on peculiar problems of proof for particular issues. More-
over, if the exception is to preserve the values served by the rule, it
must rest on a judgment that for some issues the functions of the
rule are either unnecessary or outweighed in importance by severe
problems of proof. These conditions are seldom satisfied.
A. Access to Evidence
If the evidence on an issue is sparse or nonexistent, then the fact-
finder cannot distinguish true from false claims much more effectively
than by chance. A nearly unbiased rule of decision, which requires
proof by a preponderance of evidence, would result in a high risk
both of errors favoring the government and of errors favoring the
defendant 06 A cautious rule of decision, requiring proof by the
government beyond a reasonable doubt, would distribute the errors
differently, reducing the chance of a false conviction and increasing
the chance of a false acquittal. No rule can enable a factfinder with
low power of discrimination or little evidence to increase the chance
of a true conviction without causing a proportional increase in the
chance of a false conviction.
If it were possible to improve the power of the factfinder or the
evidentiary situation, however, the risks of either kind of error would
be reduced. And under the reasonable doubt rule, the risk of false
conviction would remain negligible, while the risk of false acquittal
(and hence the chance of a true conviction) would improve. A tech-
nique for eliciting relevant evidence and thereby improving the power
of the factfinder thus offers the possibility of improving the ac-
curacy of finding facts without in any way undermining the values
behind the reasonable doubt rule.
The matter becomes more complicated, however, when the technique
proposed for eliciting relevant evidence is to create an exception to
the reasonable doubt rule. The problem of sparse evidence sometimes
arises not because evidence is unavailable but because the parties have
failed to collect and produce available evidence. The risk of that
failure may seem especially acute when the important evidence on an
issue is more accessible to the defendant than to the government.
Under a rule requiring proof by the government beyond a reasonable
96. More precisely, the distribution of errors depends on the a priori probabilities,
see note 93 supra. If the factfinder produces results approximately by chance, then it
should divide both the guilty population and the innocent population in half, con-
victing half of the guilty group and half of the innocent group. The ratio of false con-
victions to false acquittals will be the same as the ratio of truly innocent to truly guilty
people in the population under study.
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doubt, the defendant may deliberately fail to collect and produce
evidence in the expectation that he will prevail if no evidence at all
is produced.97 In order to elicit evidence that is peculiarly accessible
to the defendant, courts and legislatures have sometimes assigned to
the defendant the burden of persuasion on particular issues. On that
reasoning, defendants have been required to prove insanity,9 s or a
proper purpose,99 or the possession of a valid license. M0
The device of assigning the burden of persuasion to the defendant
may well be effective at eliciting relevant evidence, and it probably
avoids the constitutional objection to more direct devices for eliciting
evidence from a criminal defendant, an objection rooted in the Fifth
Amendment's ban on compulsory self-incrimination.' 0 ' Nevertheless,
even though eliciting evidence in this manner may not violate the ban
on self-incrimination, it does grave violence to the values served by
the reasonable doubt rule itself. For an exception to the reasonable
doubt rule does more than elicit evidence from the defendant. Even
if the defendant produces all the evidence available to him, the
burden of persuasion remains with him, and close cases are resolved
97. Especially in light of the limitations on the power of the government to compel
the defendant to produce evidence, by virtue of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination and the limited authority for pretrial discovery in criminal
cases. The force of this objection should not, however, be overstated. The Fifth Amend-
ment limits the government only with respect to evidence that is both testimonial in
character, United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973), and within the personal
control of the defendant, Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), leaving considerable
room for the exercise of legal compulsion to obtain evidence from other sources, or
nontestimonial evidence from the defendant. Prevailing discovery rules impose other
limitations, which stem at least in part from the reluctance of the government to permit
reciprocal discovery by the defendant. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472-79 (1973).
There is a trend toward liberalization of discovery in criminal cases, which may do more
to relieve problems of access to evidence than any change in the rules governing the
burden of persuasion. Finally, even when the defendant is immune from direct legal
compulsion, the risk of conviction is a powerful incentive for him to produce evidence
because his failure to do so is likely to count strongly against him with the factfinder,
and might well increase the risk of conviction under any burden of persuasion.
98. E.g., Buzynski v. Oliver, 538 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 503 (1976);
Grace v. State, 231 Ga. 113, 200 S.E.2d 248 (1973).
99. E.g., James v. United States, 350 A.2d 748, 749-50 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 872
(1976).
100. E.g., Rossi v. United States, 289 U.S. 89, 91-92 (1933); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623, 674 (1887); Commonwealth v. Davis, 359 Mass. 758, 758, 270 N.E.2d 925, 926 (1971).
It is not clear why the license cases belong in this category at all. The defendant has
ready access to evidence concerning his license, but the state has equally good access to
equally good evidence. The issue is hardly distinguishable from others in this respect.
The defendant's access to evidence is no greater here than for most other issues in a
criminal case, since most of those issues concern his own behavior or state of mind. And
the state's access to evidence is not peculiarly limited here; indeed, it is greater than for
many issues that are traditio'nally assigned to the prosecution's case, such as those in-
volving the defendant's intent or state of mind.
101. See note 97 supra.
1334
Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases
against him. At the moment of decision, the function of compensating
for bias against the defendant is utterly abandoned, as are the symbolic
function of the rule and the constitutional judgment about the rela-
tive costs of errors. The constitutional valuation of errors might seem
to be served by a device which improves the power of the factfinder,
because for a given rule of decision such a device improves the ratio of
true convictions to false ones. But any improvement in that ratio is
undermined if it is accomplished by moving the factfinder from a
cautious rule of decision to an unbiased one, which calls for nearly
equal errors of each kind.
If there were no alternative device for eliciting evidence from the
defendant, the need might be sufficient to warrant an exception from
the reasonable doubt rule and a sacrifice of the values it protects.
Many jurisdictions, however, have found a less drastic device adequate
to the purpose. In the federal courts, and in many states, issues for
which the defendant is thought to have special access to persuasive
evidence are governed by a rule that assigns to the defendant a burden
of producing evidence, 102 but not the ultimate burden of persuasion.
Under such a rule, some threshold level of evidence is specified as
adequate to raise the issue. If that threshold is not met, the issue is not
put to the factfinder, and the effect is similar to a directed verdict for
the government on that issue. If the threshold requirement is satisfied,
then the issue is presented to the factfinder under the ordinary rule
requiring proof by the government beyond a reasonable doubt. 0 3 In
theory this rule should be somewhat less effective at eliciting evidence
than an exception to the reasonable doubt rule, because a defendant
might satisfy the threshold requirement while withholding evidence
he would introduce were he required to carry the burden of persua-
sion. In practice, however, it is often difficult for a defendant to
calculate so finely or divide his evidence so precisely; moreover, the
threshold requirement can be adjusted somewhat to take account of
special problems. 0 4 Many federal and state courts have long used this
102. The terms are defined in note 3 supra.
103. In a jury trial, failure to meet the burden of producing evidence has the result
of removing the issue from the jury; it is resolved against the defendant by the judge,
and the jury never hears about it. In a trial before a judge, failure to meet the burden
of producing evidence of course has no role in selecting which decisionmaker will decide
the issues. It does, however, affect the process of decision, since it leads to a decision
against the defendant without reference to the reasonable doubt rule. For a case in-
volving trial before a judge, see United States v. Freeman, 498 F.2d 569, 576 (2d Cir.
1974).
104. The commentary on what will satisfy the burden of producing evidence is
singularly unhelpful. Distinctions are made between the "scintilla" of evidence that will
not suffice, and "some evidence" that will. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, at § 338; 1
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rule for insanity, 10 duress, 0 entrapment, 07 and other defenses pre-
senting peculiar problems of access to evidence.' 08 A jurisprudence has
developed for each issue concerning the sort of evidence that will
satisfy the burden of production. Unless for some issue there is reason
to doubt the effectiveness of this device, the interest in improving
access to evidence cannot provide a sufficient reason to abandon the
values served by the reasonable doubt rule.
B. Improbable Claims
The risk of various kinds of errors is affected not only by the power
of the factfinder and by the choice of a rule of decision, but also by
the facts about the population being tried. If for some issue the de-
fendant's claim is highly improbable, then the chance of falsely reject-
ing it is small, no matter what factfinder or what decision rule is in
use. For highly improbable claims, then, perhaps there is no need to
compensate for bias against the defendant or to introduce bias in his
favor.
The argument has been more confused than necessary because courts
have in general failed to specify what is meant by an improbable
claim. 1 9 Is the prevalence of the defendant's claim to be evaluated
against the universe of all people, or all criminal defendants? Should
it be, more narrowly, all defendants charged with his sort of crime,
or, more broadly, all people who in fact engage in the conduct alleged,
whether or not they are charged with crime?
To illustrate the nature of the confusion, suppose it is a crime to
sell alcoholic beverages without a license. In allocating the burden of
WORKING PAPERS OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 15-17
(1970). In the context of particular issues, and recurring fact situations, however, courts
have developed a common law of sufficiency for this purpose. See, e.g., Kadis v. United
States, 373 F.2d 370, 374-75 (lst Cir. 1967) (discussing evidence sufficient to raise issue of
entrapment).
105. For federal courts, the rule was established in Davis v. United States, 160 U.S.
469, 476 (1895). For states, see, e.g., Gales v. State, 338 So. 2d 436, 438 (Crim. App. Ala.),
cert. denied, 338 So. 2d 438 (Ala. 1976); People v. Wells, 30 Ill. App. 3d 968, 968, 333
N.E.2d 496, 497 (1975).
106. E.g., United States v. Smith, 532 F.2d 158, 161 (10th Cir. 1976); People v. Manson,
61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 341 N.E.2d
697, 698-99 (Mass. App. 1976).
107. E.g., United States v. Robinson, 539 F.2d 1181, 1184 (8th Cir. 1976); Notaro v.
United States, 363 F.2d 169, 174-75 n.6 (9th Cir. 1966); People v. Wurbs, 38 111. App. 3d
360, 364-65, 347 N.E.2d 879, 882-83 (1976).
108. E.g., United States v. Ortega, 517 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 1975) (reliance on
official advice as defense to fraud to grand jury); People v. Patrick, 541 P.2d 320, 322
(Colo. App. 1975) (choice of evils as defense to kidnapping); Holland v. State, 352
N.E.2d 752, 760-61 (Ind. 1976) (abandonment as defense to felony-murder).
109. See, e.g., cases cited in note 95 supra.
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proof on the issue whether the seller was licensed, should we be con-
cerned with the prevalence of licenses in the general population? In
the population of persons who sell alcoholic beverages, legally or
illegally? In the population of persons accused of illegal sales? Accused
persons who claim to have a license? Licenses may be extremely rare
in the general population, more common in the-class of all sellers, less
common in the class of accused sellers. Is the defense of having a
license, then, an improbable claim which should for that reason be
allocated to the defendant? Or is selling without a license the rare
event, which should for that reason be proved by the prosecution?
If a change in the rules of proof is designed to compensate for an
especially high risk of error in the case of improbable claims, then
the probability judgment should be made for the class of cases to
which the rule will apply. And that is the class of prosecutions that
proceed to trial on the issue in question. Unfortunately, it is not only
difficult to assess the characteristics of that class at any given time, but
also unrealistic to assume that the composition of the class is stable.
Any change in the rules of proof will have some effect on decisions
to prosecute. If the defendant is assigned the burden with respect
to an improbable claim, then prosecutors will proceed more readily in
the face of that claim. The net result may be that in the new class of
litigated cases, the claim is no longer so improbable, and the rule of
proof is no longer justified. And of course the cycle can work just as
well in reverse.
Moreover, even after an improbable claim has been identified,
there'is no reason to regard it as especially vulnerable to inaccurate
decisionmaking. The unusual character of a claim should ordinarily
affect the factfinder's evaluation of the evidence. The factfinder is
quite properly skeptical of a story that seems to him improbable in
the light of his common-sense knowledge of ordinary human events.110
If, having discounted the defendant's claim for its improbability, he
nevertheless finds the case a close one, it would be redundant to use
a burden-of-proof rule that directs him to discount the claim still
further for its improbability. Under such a rule, the defendant with
an unusual claim is doubly damned for it.11
110. The standard jury instructions for use in the federal courts tell the jury to give
the evidence "a reasonable and fair construction, in the light of your common knowl-
edge of the natural tendencies and inclinations of human beings." 1 E. DEvr-r & C.
BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRAcrCE AND INSTRUTIONS § 15.01 (3d ed. 1977). This instruction
is consistent with the Supreme Court's repeated assertion that the essential function of
the jury is to exercise "the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen." Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); see also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1972).
111. See Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14
VAND. L. REv. 807, 817-18 (1961).
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Suppose, for example, that it is relatively rare for bank robbers, or
anyone else, to experience the threats that give rise to a valid duress
defense. The infrequency of duress in general, or among bank robbers,
properly causes the factfinder to be skeptical of evidence tending to
show duress. That infrequency would be counted twice if it also
generated an instruction that the defendant should bear the burden
of persuasion on the issue, that a close case should be resolved against
the claim.
Unless there is special reason to doubt the reliability of the fact-
finder, the goal of accurate factfinding cannot justify a principle that
allocates the burden of proof in accordance with statistical probabili-
ties. The fact that a claim is improbable is not sufficient to mark that
claim as peculiarly vulnerable to error and therefore appropriate for
an exception to the reasonable doubt rule. The exception is appro-
priate only for those claims that are not only improbable, but also
likely to be consistently misperceived by the factfinder.
It is not easy, however, to identify issues that meet this description.
Without contrary evidence it must be assumed that the probabilities of
the case are adequately taken into account by the factfinder, and
therefore the problem of compensating for improbable defense claims
cannot provide a sufficient reason to withdraw protection from the
values served by the reasonable doubt rule.
IV. Facts that Justify Conviction
If the Constitution permits a legislature or court to exempt some
issues in a criminal case from the reasonable doubt rule, the criteria
for identifying those issues must be related to the purposes of the
rule. One might argue simply that the reasonable doubt rule is de-
signed to minimize certain kinds of errors: to declare the unacceptable
character of erroneous convictions, and to make them much less likely
than erroneous acquittals. With respect to that purpose, every issue in
a case might seem to be like every other because for any issue an
erroneous decision against the defendant leads to a conviction that is in
some sense erroneous. The only reason to exempt an issue would be
that other factors adequately tilted the scale toward the defendant on
that issue, rendering the reasonable doubt rule unnecessary."
2
The basis for the reasonable doubt rule can, however, be more
precisely put: errors favoring the government are not all equally of-
fensive. The rule is one of several constitutional provisions that set
112. See Part III supra.
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criminal prosecutions apart from determinations of civil liability.11 3
These rules create special barriers to a criminal conviction, recognizing
and reinforcing its unique significance for the defendant and for the
community. The special character of a criminal conviction lies in its
substantial stigmatizing effect, the possibility of imprisonment, and the
fact that it serves not merely to impose costs on the defendant but
also to express the condemnation of the community." 14 The costs to a
defendant of an erroneous conviction are the same, no matter what
issue is wrongly decided. But for the community some errors are more
repugnant than others, and some such distinction can fairly be read
into the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. The constitutional preference for avoiding erroneous convic-
tions is part of a broader commitment to individualized justice, at the
cost of efficiency, in determining whether a defendant has committed
a crime and thereby made himself vulnerable to punishment. Be-
cause the criminal sanction is an especially serious matter for both
the defendant and the community, it is especially important to ensure
that it is imposed only on a defendant who has forfeited his right to
be free from punishment. The reasonable doubt rule reflects a partic-
113. Some of them are cited in note 68 supra. In addition, criminal proceedings are
singled out for special treatment in the provision for interstate extradition, U.S. CONsT.
art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; the ban on double jeopardy and compulsory self-incriminization, id.
amend V; the ban on cruel and unusual punishment, id. amend. VIII, as construed in
Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1410-11 (1977); the restriction of involuntary servitude
to cases of punishment for crime, U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII.
There is room for disagreement, of course, about what constitutes a criminal prosecu-
tion, and the answer has not always been the same for all purposes. Compare In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967) (juvenile delinquency proceedings criminal for purposes
of privilege against self-incrimination) with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541,
550-51 (1971) (juvenile delinquency proceedings not criminal for purposes of right to jury
trial).
114. Professor Henry Hart attempted to describe the distinctive method of the
criminal law in his important article, The Arms of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958). See also H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of
Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1 (1968). It has been argued that a
distinctive criminal law method based on blameworthiness should be abandoned. See,
e.g., B. WoorroN, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 52-57, 117-18 (1963). One response is that
it is desirable for various reasons to maintain a system with the special substantive
character and therefore the associated procedural safeguards of criminal law. See, e.g.,
H.L.A. HART, Changing Conceptions of Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND REPONSIBILITY
186 (1968). Another response is that it is inevitable that any system for dealing with the
behavior now called criminal will entail the sanctions and attitudes that characterize
present criminal law and therefore require the procedural safeguards. See, e.g., In re
Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (consequences of involuntary civil commitment
similar to criminal conviction; proof beyond reasonable doubt required); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975)
(many criminal procedures apply to civil commitment because consequences similar to
conviction). It seems to be common ground, at least, that the criminal law as presently
arranged is characterized by sanctions and attitudes relating to culpability that distinguish
it from other legal proceedings.
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ular concern with accurate determination of the facts that establish
the forfeiture, the facts that provide what might be called the justifica-
tion for invoking the criminal sanction.
That commitment to individualized justice need not extend, how-
ever, to the determination of facts that are tied more closely to the
proper administration of institutions than to the justification for
convicting the defendant. 115 Such facts may well have practical im-
portance for the outcome of a case. They do not, however, form part
of the factual predicate for imposing the criminal sanction. In de-
termining these facts, an error favoring the government does not
directly threaten the values served by the reasonable doubt rule. When
the culpability of the defendant is not at issue, the determination has
little symbolic importance. As a first approximation, then, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the constitutional aversion to errors that
favor the government is limited to errors in determining facts that
establish individual culpability."06
On this theory, the rule need not apply to the determination of facts
that merely control the admissibility of evidence in a criminal case.
Before a confession can be admitted it must be found voluntary; 117
before the fruits of a search can be admitted, the search must be
115. See note 49 supra (distinction between substance and procedure). Earlier it was
argued that procedural rules, or rules for the management of litigation, are less central
to the concern of the political branches than rules for "primary" conduct. From that
premise it was possible to make sense of the constitutional strategy that regulates pro-
cedure much more stringently than it regulates substantive criminal law. Among the
procedures imposed by the Constitution is the rule requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. When it comes to defining the proper scope of the rule, the substance-procedure
distinction is again useful, but with a reverse twist. Although the reasonable doubt rule is
procedural in the sense that it is a rule for the management of litigation, its primary
purpose is to affect the outcome of that litigation and therefore to affect substantive
rights. For that reason burden-of-proof rules have often been classed as substantive for
purposes that are not of immediate concern, e.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117
(1943) (law applicable in federal diversity cases); Robinson v. Gaines, 331 SAV.2d 653,
655-56 (Mo. 1960) (interstate choice of law). But see Weir v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
340 Mass. 66, 69, 162 N.E.2d 793, 797 (1959). See generally RESTATE.tENT (SECOND) CON-
FLICT OF LAWS §§ 133-34 & Reporter's Notes (1971); Morgan, Choice of Law Governing
Proof, 58 HARV. L. REv. 153, 180-94 (1944).
More to the point, the reasonable doubt rule is concerned with those issues that are
themselves substantive rather than procedural. The result can be visualized as three
levels of constitutional regulation: the Constitution imposes minimal requirements on
the substantive criminal law; stringent requirements on the procedures for proving sub-
stantive claims; and minimal requirements on the procedures for proving procedural
claims.
116. A number of commentators have taken this view. See, e.g., H. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 136-39 (1968). Professor Fletcher noted with approval
a trend in American and continental law toward the isolation of issues relating to
culpability for decision under strict burden-of-proof rules. Fletcher, supra note 21, at
910-25, 933-35.
117. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
1340
Vol. 86: 1299, 1977
Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases
found legal;"" before hearsay testimony can be admitted, it must
be found to fit within an exception to the hearsay rule."a9 The de-
termination of these preliminary facts does not as a matter of law
either control or justify the outcome of the case, though in practice
it may well be dispositive. But a person is not less culpable because
he has made an involuntary confession, been subjected to an invalid
search, or been damned by improperly admitted hearsay testimony. If
an error favoring the government is made in determining such an
issue, it does not necessarily follow that any resulting conviction im-
poses criminal sanctions on an innocent or undeserving person. An
error in determining admissibility may impair the accuracy of the
decision about guilt, it may enhance the accuracy of the decision, or
it may do neither. It has no necessary relation to the accuracy of the
decision to convict.120 On this reasoning the Supreme Court in Lego
v. Twomey'12 ' held that the reasonable doubt rule does not govern
proof of the voluntariness of a confession.' 22 Because that rule is best
understood as a barrier to convictions that lack a basis in the de-
fendant's conduct, the Lego Court was correct in refusing to find the
rule applicable of its own force to questions of admissibility. As the
Lego dissenters noted, there may be independent reasons of policy or
of constitutional principle to invoke the higher standard of proof for
these issues. That would be appropriate if for a particular issue con-
siderations of individualized justice, or other reasons, made it im-
portant to make a symbolic and practical commitment to avoiding
errors in favor of the government. 23 But that inquiry must be sep-
arately made for each preliminary issue; the answer does not follow
from the constitutional commitment to avoid erroneous convictions,
expressed in Winship.1'2 4
118. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
119. See C. MCCoRMICK, supra note 9, §§ 244-327.
120. Hearsay testimony is excluded to enhance the reliability of factfinding, and
involuntary confessions are excluded at least partly for the same reason. It might there-
fore be argued that error in admitting such evidence necessarily impairs the accuracy of
the decision about guilt. But evidence that falls in a category generally thought un-
reliable may nevertheless in a particular case be sufficiently reliable to enhance the
accuracy of factfinding or at least to avoid impairing it. The relationship between the
error in admitting such testimony and an erroneous decision to convict is contingent
rather than necessary. Moreover, because the admissibility decision is somewhat remote
from the decision about guilt, less symbolic importance attaches to the rule that
governs the admissibility decision.
121. 404 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1972).
122. Lego upheld a statute that imposed the burden of persuasion on the govern-
ment, but required only proof by a preponderance of evidence.
123. 404 U.S. at 494-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. For a fine treatment of burdens of persuasion for these threshold issues in the
wake of Lego, see Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27
STAN. L. REv. 271 (1975).
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A second class of issues can also be excluded on this analysis from
the requirement of proof by the government beyond a reasonable
doubt. Some questions of fact must be resolved to determine whether a
case is properly before the court. In determining whether a prosecu-
tion is barred by double jeopardy, 1 2 or by a practice of discriminatory
enforcement, 126 courts have sometimes assigned the burden of persua-
sion to the defendant. In determining whether the statute of limita-
tions has run, 27 whether jurisdiction and venue are proper,128 or
whether the defendant is mentally competent for trial,129 courts have
sometimes assigned the burden of persuasion to the defendant; more
often it is assigned to the prosecution, but proof by a preponderance of
evidence will suffice. 30 These issues, unlike the issues of admissibility,
may control the outcome of the case as a matter of law, and not just
as a matter of practicality. It is in law a prerequisite to criminal con-
viction that the defendant be tried without double jeopardy or dis-
criminatory enforcement, in a court of competent jurisdiction, in a
timely fashion, in a condition of mental competence.13 Put more
precisely, however, these facts are prerequisite to the hearing that
leads to conviction; they are not invoked to justify the conviction or
explain the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct. These facts de-
termine the appropriateness of the forum and not of the sanction. If
an error favoring the government is made on such an issue it does not
necessarily follow that any resulting conviction imposes criminal sanc-
tions on an innocent or undeserving person. As with the facts that
125. E.g., United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 584
(1941); Kastel v. United States, 23 F.2d 156, 156 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 604
(1928).
126. E.g., People v. MacFarland, 540 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Colo. 1975); City of Minneapolis
v. Buschette, 240 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Minn. 1976); People v. Acme Markets, 37 N.Y.2d 326,
331, 334 N.E.2d 555, 557-58, 372 N.Y.S.2d 590, 594 (1975).
127. E.g., Osborn v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 259, 268-72, 194 P.2d 176, 181-83 (1948).
128. See United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412 (1820).
129. E.g., Johnson v. Brierley, 334 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Pa. 1971); State v. Marks, 252
La. 277, 211 So. 2d 261 (1968), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 983 (1972), on remand,
263 La. 355, 268 So. 2d 252 (1972); Young v. Smith, 8 Wash. App. 276, 505 P.2d 824 (1973);
R. v. Podola, [1960] Q.B. 325 (C.A.).
130. E.g., United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 986-89 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 1119 (1977) (competence); Hill v. United States, 284 F.2d 754, 755 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 873 (1961) (venue); Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302,
305 (8th Cir. 1960) (Blackmun, J.) (venue); People v. McGill, 10 Cal. App. 2d 155, 159-60,
51 P.2d 433, 435 (1935) (statute of limitations).
131. Indeed, some aspects of jurisdiction, venue, and mental competence are required
not only by statute but also by the Constitution. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a
federal defendant the right to a trial by a jury "of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed"; and due process guarantees every defendant the right
to be tried in a condition of mental competence, Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 377
(1966). The Constitution is also the source of the ban on double jeopardy, U.S. CoNsT.
amend V., and discriminatory enforcement, id. amend. XIV (equal protection).
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determine admissibility of evidence, an error may enhance or impair
the accuracy of the decision to convict, or it may do neither. It has
no necessary relation to the accuracy of that decision. If the reasonable
doubt rule is understood to protect against unjustified convictions, the
rule need apply only to the proof of the facts that have legal status as
part of the justification for conviction. These threshold facts are not
in that class. Once again, there may be independent reasons to invoke
the higher standard of proof for those issues. That result does not
follow, however, from the strong preference of Winship for avoiding
unjustified convictions.
Limiting the reasonable doubt rule to proof of issues related to
culpability seems, in general, to protect the values served by the
reasonable doubt rule. The culpability criterion is, however, exceed-
ingly difficult to apply, because it is often difficult to determine
whether an issue should be characterized as relevant to culpability.
For example, some courts have treated the defense of entrapment
as an exception to the reasonable doubt rule, on the theory that the
rule applies only to issues involving culpability, and that entrapment
is not such an issue. 132 In their view, a defendant induced to sell
narcotics by a government official is neither more nor less culpable
than one induced to do it by a private acquaintance. His defense
prevails in order to discourage government officials from generating
crime, and to avoid judicial participation in that enterprise. Other
courts have suggested that the defense reflects the view that a reluctant
criminal is less culpable than his eager counterpart.133 If the defense
132. E.g., United States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799, 801-05 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1064 (1972); People v. Valverde, 246 Cal. App. 2d 318, 322-26, 54 Cal. Rptr. 528,
530-33 (1966); People v. Laietta, 30 N.Y.2d 68, 74-75, 281 N.E.2d 157, 161, 330 N.Y.S.2d
351, 356-57, cert. denied, 407 U.S. 923 (1972).
133. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973) (defendant's predisposition
fatal to entrapment defense because he was "not an 'unwary innocent' but an 'unwary
criminal' "). Professor Park has argued persuasively that the defense as formulated by
the federal courts can best be understood as a judgment about culpability. Park, The
Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 240-43, 265 (1976). He suggests that the
reluctant criminal may be seen as less culpable whether his temptor is a public official
or a private person, and that the defense may be limited to cases of official inducement
for reasons extrinsic to culpability.
Indeed, even the limitation of the defense to cases of official inducement might be
explained with reference to culpability, on the theory that a person induced to sell
narcotics to a government official is less culpable than one who sells to a private person,
because the sale causes no harm and is therefore no more culpable than shooting a
hallucination or stealing one's own umbrella.
The relationship of harm to culpability is controversial, to say the least. For an ex-
tended argument that harm is irrelevant to culpability and also irrelevant to dangerous-
ness, and should therefore be of little significance for the criminal law, see Schulhofer,
Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on Results of Conduct in the Criminal
Law, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1497 (1974). The criminal law does take extensive account of
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relates to culpability, it is subject to proof by the government beyond
a reasonable doubt. If not, it can properly be exempted from the rule.
The relationship of the insanity defense to culpability is similarly
controversial. In the 1952 case of Leland v. Oregon,34 the Supreme
Court upheld an extraordinary statute requiring the defendant to
prove the defense of insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. In rejecting
the defendant's challenge, the Court observed that insanity was an
issue set apart from guilt of the crime charged, and that guilt had
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.135 On the authority of Leland,
many courts have subsequently sustained statutes requiring the de-
fendant to prove insanity by a preponderance of evidence.' 30 One
characteristic explanation is that insanity does not negate culpability;
that the reason for the defense is simply to direct insane offenders to
special institutions, more suitable than prisons, for their confine-
ment.137 The opposing view of the insanity defense was clearly stated
by Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Leland.138 For him, the purpose
of the insanity defense is precisely to prevent the conviction of persons
who could not have acted otherwise, who are not properly regarded as
culpable. 1 9
Similar difficulties arise in connection with crimes that specify
some fact about the identity of the victim.' 4 0 The critical facts about
harm, in the many respects detailed by Professor Schulhofer, because lawmakers have
traditionally regarded harm as a significant index of the seriousness of a crime, if not
the culpability of an offender. It will be argued at pp. 1345-47 infra that a fact that
measures the seriousness of a crime, even if it does not measure the culpability of the
offender, should be seen as part of the justification for punishment, and therefore subject
to the reasonable doubt rule.
134. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
135. Id. at 794-96.
136. E.g., United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145, 1154-56 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 977 (1974); Rivera v. State, 351 A.2d 561 (Del.), appeal dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question, 429 U.S. 877 (1976) (a disposition with precedential value
under Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975)); cf. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
624, 705-06 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citing Leland with approval).
137. See Goldstein & Katz, supra note 89.
138. 343 U.S. at 802.
139. Justice Frankfurter thought that problems of proof would justify some adjust-
ment in the rules of proof for the insanity defense. Id. at 804-05. It is unclear whether
he contemplated a rule giving the defendant the burden of persuasion by a preponder-
ance of evidence, or merely giving the defendant the burden of producing some evidence
to raise the issue. See Part III supra. But he rejected problems of proof as a justification
for the Oregon statute giving the defendant the burden of persuasion beyond a reason-
able doubt. Id. at 805-06. And he rejected in its entirety the argument that insanity is
not related to culpability. Id.
140. See, e.g., Lucas v. United States, 163 U.S. 612 (1896) (murder of non-Indian by
Indian in Indian Territory); Dershowitz, The Special Victim Is Not New In the Law,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1977, § IV, at 6, col. 3 (discussing proposals to upgrade crime of
assaulting elderly).
1344
Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases
the victim may be seen as relevant to culpability, or they may relate
only to the jurisdiction of the court or other institutional considera-
tions. For example, it is a federal crime to assault a federal officer, 14'
and not, in most circumstances, to assault a private citizen. Can the
defendant in such a case be required to prove that his victim was not
a federal officer, on the ground that the federal character of the victim
does not affect culpability? The federal character of the victim may be
nerely a ground of federal jurisdiction, determining only which in-
stitution, federal or state, shall receive which of the equally culpable
offenders. -42 Alternatively, the federal character of the victim may
heighten the culpability of the assault, in that the assault not only
injures a person but also insults and interferes with the conduct of
government business.' 43
Such controversies can, in principle, be resolved. Legislative history
may show directly whether the legislature that enacted the statute
regarded a fact as important for reasons relating to culpability or for
other reasons. A comparison of possible sentences may suggest the
answer to that question indirectly, on the theory that a longer possible
sentence suggests a judgment of greater culpability. Alternatively, it
may be appropriate to consider the views of legislators and their con-
stituents at the time of enforcement, to the extent they can be ascer-
tained, in order to determine whether the defense reflects a judgment
about culpability, or serves some other purpose. This difficulty in
applying the culpability criterion does not destroy the possibility of
its use. It merely makes plain that to resolve questions about the
scope-of the reasonable doubt rule, it will be necessary to analyze and
resolve questions about the structure of the criminal law, and the re-
lationship among issues in a criminal case.
The culpability criterion confronts a more serious problem, how-
ever, which requires that it be augmented. Under existing law, some
crimes are defined in such a way that a fact is critical to the wrong-
fulness of the conduct and the reason for proscribing it, but the fact
has no relationship to the defendant's personal culpability, because it
141. 18 U.S.C. § 11 (1970).
142. Cf. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676 n.9 (1975) (federal character of the
victim need not be known or intended by the assaulter, because it is "jurisdictional only").
143. It is suggestive, but not conclusive, to note that there is a disparity in penalties.
The maximum penalty for assaulting a federal officer is three years. 18 U.S.C. § 111
(1970). For simple assault, the maximum penalty under state law is generally a year or
less. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 241 (West 1970 & Supp. 1977) (6 months); D.C. CODE
§ 22-504 (1973) (12 months); Mic. Come. LAws §§ 750.81, 750.504 (1968) (90 days); Mo.
AN. STAT. § 559.220 (Vernon 1953) (6 months). See also MODEL P NAL CODE § 201.10,
Comment at 81 & App. G at 132-40 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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may be beyond his knowledge or control. For example, it may be a
crime to sell liquor to a minor, without regard to the seller's knowledge
of the buyer's minority status.14 4 The age of the buyer is precisely
what makes the conduct wrongful, and thus it is part of the justifica-
tion for punishment in the sense of this article. Nevertheless, in the
absence of knowledge or at least negligence on the part of the de-
fendant, the age of the buyer seems irrelevant to the culpability of the
seller's conduct. If it is not culpable to sell liquor to an adult, it cannot
be culpable to sell liquor to someone reasonably believed to be an
adult, when that person is in fact a minor. One need not reject the
purpose of the law to note that it punishes as criminal some people
who lack personal culpability.
The wisdom of imposing criminal punishment for conduct that
lacks any significant component of personal culpability is subject to
serious question.145 Nevertheless, so long as such conduct is treated as
criminal, the facts that establish the crime should be subject to the
reasonable doubt rule. If all facts unrelated to culpability were for
that reason exempt from the rule, then for such crimes the state could
imprison and stigmatize a defendant on proof of guilt by a pre-
ponderance of evidence, or perhaps even on failure by the defendant
to prove his own innocence. That result would plainly violate the
purposes of the reasonable doubt rule, as a commitment to individ-
ualized justice in criminal cases and as a shield against unjustified
incarceration and the stigma of criminality. 4 If conviction entails
144. See Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825, cert. denied, 363 U.S.
848 (1959).
145. It has been suggested that for offenses not involving moral culpability, there
should be no possibility of imprisonment or the stigma of criminality; such offenses
should lead only to fines, and they should be given a neutral name, like "violation" or
"civil offense." It would perhaps follow that the procedural requirements of a criminal
prosecution could be eliminated as well. See, e.g., Kadish, Some Observations on the
Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 423,
440-49 (1963); Perkins, The Civil Offense, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 832 (1952); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 1.04 & Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); id. § 6.03(4), (5).
146. Although Patterson offers few principles for finding the limits on the power of
the state to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant, the Court did reaffirm the
proposition that in criminal cases the state may not constitutionally shift the burden to
the defendant on all issues. 97 S. Ct. at 2327. Even in civil cases, where there is no
such constitutional bar, laws seldom assign the defendant the burden of proof on the
whole case. When they do, it is generally a case in which plaintiff is seeking to enforce
the prior determination of an administrative agency. The prior administrative determina-
tion makes it rational to impose a presumption in favor of the plaintiff or agency. E.g.,
26 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7403 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (suit by Government against taxpayer for
collection of taxes previously assessed by IRS), discussed in United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 440-43 (1976); 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1970) (suit by farmer against packer-dealer for
reparations ordered by Dep't of Agriculture), discussed in Verkuil, A Study of Informal
Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHi. L. REv. 739, 763 n.95 (1976).
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those consequences, then erroneous conviction is too serious to allow
such cavalier treatment of the burden of proof, whether or not con-
viction involves a judgment of culpability. It is equally offensive to
decide erroneously that stigma and incarceration are justified,
whether the error involves a fact within the defendant's knowledge or
control and therefore morally significant, or a fact beyond his knowl-
edge or control but nevertheless significant as a measure of the legal
wrongfulness of his act.
Culpability does not provide an exhaustive criterion for finding the
facts subject to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, because the criminal
law does not make culpability the sole determinant of the seriousness
of a crime, or the wrongfulness of an act. But the problem suggests its
own solution. Whether culpability or some other factor provides the
justification for invoking the criminal sanction, 47 the facts that justify
the sanction are the ones that should be subject to the reasonable
doubt rule.
The central question in a criminal trial is whether the facts have
occurred that justify criminal sanctions, whether the defendant has
violated a specific criminal prohibition. When a legislature specifies
that a fact is necessary to justify a particular criminal sanction, it
makes the correct determination of that fact a matter of constitutional
significance. All the facts that define or limit the defendant's criminal
guilt stand on an equal footing with respect to the purposes of the
reasonable doubt rule. For any such fact, whether it is characterized as
an element of crime or a defense, an error that favors the government
leads to the conviction of a person who is innocent of the crime
charged. The risk of such an error provides the central occasion for
invoking the symbolic and practical functions of the reasonable doubt
rule.
Conclusion
Ultimately the principle expressed in Winship is that the invoca-
tion of the criminal sanction against an individual requires justifica-
tion of an extraordinary type. For this reason, the conditions for in-
voking the sanction must be both specified and satisfied with more
than usual care. Care in specifying the conditions is required by the
constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and
vague statutes. Care in satisfying the conditions is required by the
147. See, e.g., the controversy over resulting harm as a measure of seriousness, dis-
cussed in note 133 supra.
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constitutional rule that all doubts, even small ones, must be resolved
in favor of the defendant, i.e., that the government must prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt.
These two doctrines are intimately related. It would be useless
to insist on precise criteria for conviction, formulated in advance of
the event, if those criteria could be satisfied by low standards of proof.
The requirement of precision, and the ban on ex post facto statutes,
are not limited in their application to facts that define a crime rather
than a defense, or to any other specially important facts in a criminal
case; they govern all the facts that specify the conduct by which a
person makes himself vulnerable to criminal sanctions. 1"8 The reason-
able doubt rule should reach at least as far. Issues in the definition of
crimes and defenses are protected from retroactive change, and from
vague definition, because together they define the boundary conditions
for culpable conduct. The careful delineation of those boundaries
serves two important functions: to give fair warning to potential
violators, and to limit the discretion of enforcement officials.140 When
there is a question whether in a particular case the boundary criteria
have been met, it is important for both those functions that the
government be held to rigorous standards of proof. If a fact has been
specified as necessary to justify the invocation of the criminal sanction,
then its determination is sufficiently important to require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
148. What they do not govern is procedural matters. See, e.g., Duncan v. Missouri,
152 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1894) (dictum) (ex post facto change of court); Cook v. United
States, 138 U.S. 157, 183 (1891) (ex post facto venue change); Clements v. United States,
266 F.2d 397 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 985 (1959) (ex post facto change in statute
of limitations).
149. See generally, Note, The Void-for-1Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
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